Walid Phares, born in Beirut, Lebanon, is an Associate Professor of political science and comparative politics at Florida Atlantic University and a visiting scholar at the University of Miami and Florida International University. Professor Phares holds degrees in Law and Political Science, a Masters in International Law and a Ph.D. in International Relations. He is the author of eight books on the Middle East including: Pluralism in the World, The Iranian Islamic Revolution, and Lebanese Christian Nationalism: The Rise and fall of an Ethnic Resistance. He has published several articles on Sudan, Israel, Lebanon and other areas in leading scholarly periodicals such as Middle East Quarterly, Journal of Middle Eastern Studies and Global Affairs.
Read his: The Shield and the Sword The Syria-Iraq connection./ National Review 12-20-02
WALID PHARES
Writing about the Middle East Christians in a political context is a risky intellectual mission. In contrast to researching other ethno-religious groups, investigating the history, the present and future of the native peoples of the Middle East is unique. This is largely due to the fact that in the 'Arab Middle East', and invariably in the wider Middle East, ranging from Turkey to Iran, the majority-minority formula has a reductionist influence on minorities. Globally. majorities tend to assimilate and integrate minorities, whether at the national, ethnic or religious levels. These tendencies are adopted by the traditional state system of the regions as well as by its ideological elites.1
In the circle of Arab states. reductionism has an additional dimension: the negation of the cultural identity of the targeted minority.2 For example, Arab governments do not recognize the existence of the Coptic people in Egypt, the Kurdish and the Assyrian peoples in Iraq, the Berber identity in Algeria, the African ethnicity of southern Sudan, or the Lebanese Christians.3 Moreover, the native Christian ethnicities are under a constant state of oppression.
In Lebanon, where Christians enjoyed constitutionally guaranteed parity until a few years ago, hundreds of Christians are being arrested. tortured and jailed by pro-Syrian forces. In the south of Lebanon, Christian villages are bombarded constantly by Hizbullah. In the event of an Israeli withdrawal. the Christian community will be threatened by fundamentalist militias.4 Similarly, dozens of Christian villages in Egypt are routinely attacked by the Islamists. As an example, the village of Manshiet Nassr in Upper Egypt has been repeatedly attacked by Islamic fundamentalists. Dozens of people have been killed or injured.5
Today, south Sudanese Christians are targeted by the Islamist forces of Khartoum. Entire villages are being destroyed by the northern regime. Yet these tragedies, like others in the Muslim world, go unreported by the Western media and unchallenged by Western leaders.6
These examples do not represent isolated events. Nor is the neglect they receive from the media and world governments unpredictable. Thus the public in the United States is largely unaware of the Middle East that non- Muslims of the region know only too well. Christians are targeted by Islamic fundamentalists. The latter are tacitly encouraged by many governments of the region who, at best, do nothing to stop them and, at worst, actively aid and abet those responsible for the pogroms.7
Middle East Christians suffer collectively. Yet few people in the West are aware of the size of these communities. The common image of Middle Eastern Christianity is that it is limited to a few groups or individuals among the Palestinian population. In reality, the Palestinian Christians are only a fragment of the millions of Christians to be found from Sudan to Armenia.
The Copts of Egypt - Orthodox, Catholics and Protestants - are estimated at between ten to eleven million, dispersed across the country. They claim descent from the ancient Egyptians living under the Pharaohs. Their numbers shrank after the Arab invasion in AD 640. Much later, they enjoyed a temporary flowering under the British in the nineteenth century. One million Copts live in the diaspora, principally in the United States.
Seven million black Africans live in the south. Many of these tribes are Christians - Anglicans, other Protestants and Catholics. Following the Islamic conquest, the Africans of Nubia were displaced to the south. As a result of the recent civil war. more than one million south Sudanese were exiled.
There are about 1.5 million Christians in the Land of the Cedars - Maronites, Orthodox, and other communities including Protestants. As a result of the 1975 war, hundreds of thousands were displaced and exiled. There are around seven million Lebanese Christians in the diaspora and more than 1.5 million Americans are of Lebanese descent. About one million Christian Assyrians (Orthodox) and Chaldeans (Catholics) live in Iraq. Most of the Christian demographic centers are concentrated in the north. In addition. about one million Christian Mesopotamians live in North America, Scandinavia and Australia.
One million Syrian citizens are Christians. including Aramaean-Syriacs, Armenians, Orthodox and Melkites.
In Iran, the Christian population, native Persians belonging to Evangelical or Catholic denominations, or Assyrians and Armenians, reached half a million before the Islamic revolution. No accurate figures are available today, In Turkey, Christian Assyro-Syriacs, Greeks, Armenians and others do not exceed 20.000 persons living in Istanbul or in the south-east of the country.8
Before assessing the various attitudes of the Middle East Christian minorities, some distinctions are necessary. Due to the nature of the governing systems in the region, few accurate figures are available about the Christian communities. The main difficulty lies, on the one hand, in the tendency of governments to reduce the official numbers of their minorities, such as in Egypt and Iraq, and, on the other, the trend of the targeted groups to
exaggerate their demographic realities.9
This is particularly pronounced as far as Egypt's Copts and Lebanon's Christians are concerned. Regarding the former, Cairo's official estimates are between three and four million. In the Lebanese case, demographic estimates are about 50 per cent each for Muslims and Christians (based on the last census held in 1936 in which 54 per cent of the country's citizens were counted as Christians). Recent figures put Muslims at 65 per cent of the population (after calculations made for Christian migration).10
Despite the paucity of studies, the sum total of the available numbers of each group, based on parish records, puts the Christians in the Middle East between a low of fourteen million and a high of twenty million,11 In terms of ethnic identification, the dividing line runs between Arab Christians and non-Arab Christians. The former. including a large section of the Palestinian Christians, the bulk of the Jordanian Christians and many among Syria's Melkite and Orthodox elements. constitute no more than 10 per cent of Middle East Christianity.12, These 'true' 'Arab Christians' are clearly attached to the Arab language, culture and sensibilities. However. most Christians in the Middle East are historically non-Arab.13 They comprise the Assyro-Chaldeans of Iraq, the Copts of Egypt. the south Sudanese and the Aramaeans (Maronites, Syriacs and others) of Lebanon and Syria.14
Although ethnic Arabs are a minority among the Christians of the Middle East, Christian Arabists formed a majority among the intelligentsia throughout the twentieth century. Their compatibility with mainstream Arab-Muslim currents and regimes facilitated the ascension of Christian Arabists in the socio-political pyramid.15
Everywhere in the Levant. prominent Christian figures have become leading figures in Arab governments, such as Tarek Hanna Aziz. Foreign Minister of Iraq: Butros Butros Ghali, former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Egypt: George Kuriye. Director of the Presidential Office of Syria: and Hanan Ashrawi. former Spokesperson of the Palestinian delegation to the peace talks. In contrast. Christian nationalists have been kept out of public life and. in certain cases, even outlawed.16
The assimilationist trend. however. has suffered two major setbacks. One is the ascendance of Islamic fundamentalism, which is an intellectual and political threat to the secular dream. The second is the re-emergence of ethnonationalism among the majority of the Christian peoples of the Middle East. Influenced by the worldwide explosion of religious ethnicities, these minority 'nationalities' refer to historical legitimacy and in most cases also make territorial claims.17
Prior to the Islamic era, the region of the Fertile Crescent was inhabited by native populations such as the Copts of Egypt, the Assyro-Chaldeans of Mesopotamia, the Aramaeans of Syria and Lebanon, the Hebrews of the Land of Israel. the Armenians of Asia Minor, and other less numerous groups. In AD 636, Arab Muslim invaders crushed the Byzantine army at Yarmoukl8 and invaded the Middle East. From that vantage point they marched through North Africa into Spain, reaching the borders of India through Persia.
The Arab-Islamic conquest had a major impact on the region's destiny and identity.19 The conqueror imposed a new religion on the autochthonous people implementing a fast and irreversible Islamization of the mainly Christian, Jewish and Zoroastrian Middle East. Initially in the cities, then throughout the rural areas, millions of people among the conquered populations had three options open to them:
First, adherence to Islam, which would guarantee them the same citizens rights as that granted to Arabs. Second. the right to maintain their own religious beliefs, but deprived of their political, social and cultural rights. This option, known as the dhimmi status, required the payment of a special tax called the Jizya. The tax was supposed to guarantee the 'protection' of Christians and Jews living under Muslim rule.20
The third option was confrontational: conversion to Islam by the sword. The conquered people were thereby forced to accept the new religion. If not. they were either eliminated or forced to leave the area.21
Within a few decades, formidable pressures forced the majority of the indigenous masses, from the Caspian to the Mediterranean to accept Islam.22 In addition to religious coercion, Islamization included the imposition of he ethnic cultural and linguistic Identity of the Arabs. Thus Arabization accompanied the spread of Islam, albeit within a smaller geographical region than the total Islamic world.23
The Arab conquerors used their bureaucratic power to replace local cultures and languages, such as those of the Coptic. Assyro-Chaldean, Aramaic and Hebrew peoples. The process of assimilation, which took decades in some areas and centimes in others, succeeded in creating an Arab sphere of predominance. The Ottomans took over the former provinces of the Arab caliphate from the Mameluke dynasty. The new empire imposed the Turkish tongue on the administration but left Arabic as the dominant popular language in its Near Eastern provinces.24 For four centuries the dhimmi peoples - particularly Christians - found themselves under multi-layers of socia-political pressure: The Arab socio-cultural assimilation, the Ottoman political and colonial domination, and the caliphate Muslim-Sunni rule.25
In the aftermath of the Arab-Muslim conquest of the Middle East, the Christian presence lost out to the conqueror. From Armenia in the north of Asia Minor to the Nubian Nile, early Christianity had flourished and its major cities constituted important centers of the Roman world. Since the conquest, however, the Christian East has shrunk both demographically as well as in its socio-political dimension. Pre-Muslim peoples of the Near East, such as Assyro-Chaldeans, Copts and Aramaeans, were Christianized in the First century. Yet by the seventh century, Arab-Muslim culture flooded the region and sought to dominate the existing identities.26
The Christian resistance to the invaders varied, as did their initial reaction to the conquest. Those who had been oppressed by the Byzantine empire.
Like the Assyrians. the Coptic people have pre-Arab roots. Following the conquest of Egypt by the Muslim armies in AD 640, Coptic uprisings spread all over the country between 725 and 830.36 A considerable proportion of the population was forced to convert to Islam and the remaining Christians became a minority under the dhimmi burden. According to Peter Mansfield. '[t]he Coptic language of the ancient Egyptians was progressively extinguished as the Arab occupation changed into full-scale colonization and assimilation, although it survived at least until the 17th century'.37
In the early twentieth century, while Egypt was under British rule. the Copts were offered political recognition as a separate identity within the country. Yet the majority of the Arabized elite accepted an 'Egyptian identity' in deference to the Muslim majority among whom they lived.38 Another group called for the establishment of a distinct and separate Coptic state. A Coptic Congress held in Assiut in March 1910 was attended by 1158 delegates. who presented a list of Coptic claims.39 The first group advocating national unity won the battle by allying itself with the Muslim political elite.40
Despite this loss, the nationalist Copts did not relent.41 In 1953, under the leadership of a young lawyer, Ibrahim Hilal, the group launched a political party called The Coptic Nation. Two weeks later, Gamal Abdul Nasser dissolved the party, jailed its leadership and forbade its activities.42 After this repression, many activists emigrated to the West, where they founded an expatriate network.
In Egypt, the constitution and laws have never recognized the existence of this community. One example is their political under-representation in government. Indeed. although the community represents one-fifth of the Egyptian population. it has only six seats in a parliament comprised of 420 seats. Moreover, the six Coptic members are nominated by presidential decree, i.e. they are hand-picked by the Muslim majority.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt led to anti-Coptic pogroms in Cairo and various parts of the countryside. In 1981. President Anwar Sadat, in an attempt to appease radical factions upset over the Camp David Accords, ordered the incarceration of the Coptic Pope Shenouda III and denounced him for anti-governmental activities, alleging there was a Coptic plan to establish a separate entity in Egypt.43
Sadat's repression led to an mcrease in Coptic nationalist activities among exiled groups operating from Christian East Beirut, Australia. Europe and Canada. but mainly from the United States.44 In 1992, Chris Hedges wrote in the New York Times:
in the last four months more than thirty people have been killed in Assiut Province, which embraces this town. including 13 Christians massacred by militants one morning in May. Assaults on Christians and the burning of their houses and shops are a daily occurrence.45
Currently, large-scale Islamist attacks on Coptic quarters and villages are increasing despite the denials of Cairo's authorities.46 The Coptic opposition denounces the government and the Islamic groups, accusing the 'Muslim-controlled Egyptian state of a conspiracy against the Coptic nation’,47 Yet the Coptic associations do not openly call for a separate entity. Instead, they focus on human rights issues. One reason they have not called for self-determination is because of demographic reality. Although they constitute the largest Christian population in the Middle East, the Coptic people do not possess the strategic advantage of other less numerically strong minorities in the region: a geographically homogeneous area of residence. Scattered all over the country, they can hardly claim, as the Kurds do, an enclave for a safe haven.48 Meanwhile, the ongoing persecution of the Coptic community does not seem to end.49
Seven million African Christians and non-Muslims live in the southern and equatorial provinces of Sudan. The north has been Islamized and Arabized by successive waves of tribes marching from Egypt and Arabia. The advance of the Arabs into Sudan was facilitated after the Muslim victory over the African Christian kingdoms in 1504.50 The attempts to assimilate the south have created resistance among its population and ignited many revolts against Khartoum's governments. Since the creation of the Sudanese entity in the late nineteenth century, a number of these uprisings were led by the Nilotic tribes. mainly the Dinka and Nuer.51
In recent history, two revolutions were led by the south. The first one started in 1956; it was organized by the Anyanya movement and quickly spread in most equatorial and southern districts, In 1972, an agreement was reached with the central government to freeze the confrontation and discuss autonomy for the African and non-Arab zones. 52
In 1983, as a reaction to a massive campaign of Islamization initiated by Khartoum. a second southern uprising was led by the Sudanese Popular Liberation Army (SPLA), achieving significant success in the field. Most of the southern provinces of the country came under the control of the SPLA;53 but a split within the SPLA and the SPLF led to internal clashes. The civil war in the south gave an opportunity for the Arab north to renew its offensive. With support from Iran,54 as well as from Libya and Syria, the new Islamist Khartoum government recaptured many strategic strongholds and marched into the southern hinterland.57 Tens of thousands of Christians were displaced or massacred.56 Currently the southern resistance is facing a major threat, but since January 1997, many Christian towns have been liberated by the SPLA.57 Two million southerners were killed in the course of the conflict.
Map 2.1 Southern Sudan
By the beginning of the seventh century, the Lebanese population had a distinct identity: they were predominantly Aramaic in their ethnicity and of the Christian faith. The latter included various communities such as the Maronites, Melkites and other oriental sects.58 Between AD 676 and 677, a general revolt against the occupier was led by the Christian forces, known also as Marada (rebels). In less than two years, the resistance succeeded in establishing an independent entity in Lebanon at a time when the Arab empire stretched from Persia to Spain. The first Maradite state, which had frontiers that reached coastal Syria and the Galilee in northern Israel, held its ground from AD 676 to 1305.59
For 600 years. the Lebanese Christians lived under Arab and Ottoman occupation. During the Arab Mameluk domination, Lebanon's populations experienced harsh repression and their demographic presence shrank towards the northern part of Mount Lebanon.
In 1975, war erupted, pitting the Christian community against a Muslim-PLO-Syrian alliance. After fifteen years of confrontation, more than 150.000 Christians were massacred and dozens of towns and villages destroyed. The Syrian army invaded the last stronghold in 1990 and eliminated the Christian resistance. With the collapse of the central free area of Lebanon, the Christian resistance lost its ability to fight for its goals.60
The 'new order' in Lebanon is ideologically Arab, spiritually Muslim and politically Syrian. Embodied in the (Saudi-sponsored) Taef umbrella agreement and reinforced by a US endorsement, a new era dawned for the Christian community which will inevitably lead either to its long-term dissolution or to a slow, massive emigration of those who can leave.61 In Lebanon, extensive human rights abuses are taking place.62 In the south, the Christians are targeted by Hizbullah,63
Barring no major developments in the next decade, the changes occurring in Lebanon vis-a-vis the Christians will no doubt produce a chain reaction in Lebanon and perhaps also in other parts of the Middle East. First, there will be an implacable Arabization followed by the Islamization of Lebanon because of the absence of a credible Christian political opposition.64
In addition, the suppression of the Christians in Lebanon caused repercussions among the other Christian minorities of the region. such as the Copts of Egypt and the Assyrians of Iraq, whose hopes were fuelled for a long time by the fate and the success of their Lebanese brethren, whose fall will undoubtedly weaken their historic will to survive.
It is perhaps pertinent to mention here that. symbolically, as far as the 'peace process' is concerned. the Mideast Christians are noticeable by their absence! Neither individual Christians nor representatives of the region's national Christian communities have been invited to participate. While an organization such as the PW has been welcomed to the negotiating table, the South Lebanon Army (SLA). the SPLA and other non-governmental groups have been kept at bay.
While Palestinian community leaders and Islamists are constantly solicited by international media, representatives of Christian movements are marginalized. The 'peace process' clearly excludes Mideast Christians.65
Palestinian and Jordanian Christians include ethnic Arabs and other minorities such as Armenians, Maronites and other Aramaeans. The Arab group, with a majority of Orthodox. Melkites. Roman Catholics and Protestants, traditionally supported Arab nationalism.66 Leaders such as George Habash, Nayef Hawatmeh, Hanan Ashrawi, Bishop Capucci and Bishop Kaf'eety emerged as historic spokespersons for the Palestinian struggle directed against Israel and the West. Until the Intifada of 1987, Palestinian Christians sided with the PLO. But this secular elite was not able to cope with the surge of Islamic radicalism following the launching in Oslo of the 'peace process'. The fact is that Hamas and Islamic Jihad - whose aim is the creation of an all-Islamic Palestine - do not present a viable alternative to the Christians.67 In the last few months even while these lines were being written, under the Western-supported Palestinian authority of Yasser Arafat, Christians feel insecure. On the West Bank. evangelicals have been arrested and jailed because of their faith.68 In Jerusalem. the Church of the Holy Sepulture was desecrated by Ararat's religious authority.69 Worse, in June 1997, anti-Christian activities reached within Israel's pre-1967 borders. The Christian population of the town of Tur'an was attacked by mobs who burned houses and cars and killed a university student. In Jordan. Christians are under the King's protection. but events across the Jordan River have already elevated tensions in that small and vulnerable kingdom.70
Under the westernized Shah regime, the nearly 500,000 Christian Iranians lived in relative peace. With the onset of the Islamic revolution, the community fell under the wrath of Khomeinism. In the course of two decades. their numbers shrank dramatically to about 50.000 souls. In the early 1990s the evangelical groups were particularly targeted.71 Between 1994 and 1997 three successive leaders were assassinated or executed by government agents. There is no Iranian-Christian agenda beyond the hope of mere physical survival coupled with a minimum of human rights. In the diaspora. particularly in the United States, Iranian Christians are active and vocal.72
There is no Christian presence in Saudi Arabia since, by law. only a Muslim can be a Saudi citizen. Churches and religious centers are not allowed. Though there once were thriving Christian communities in Arabia, today that country is ruled by an extremist anti-Christian regime.73 Reports from the Saudi kingdom constantly reveal the capital punishments, torture and imprisonment inflicted on Christian residents of all nationalities. However. neither European nor American foreign policy-makers interfere with Christian persecution in that oil-rich country.74
Despite the large-scale oppression of Middle East Christians and the large numbers of victims, both as communities and as individuals. Western powers have rarely considered intervening to help them. Although minority protection systems were provided for the Muslims of Bosnia, the Turks of northern Cyprus, the Kurds of northern Iraq and the Palestinians, the Mideast Christians, including Copts of Egypt, Africans of southern Sudan, Maronites of Lebanon and Assyro-Chaldeans of Iraq, to name a few were never considered an endangered species deserving similar attention.75
This Western abandonment of the Christian nationalities was general, systematic and clearly political. There are many factors, which contributed to this policy. One is economic. Western governments and the various US administrations acquiesced in the pressures of Arab governments not to raise the issue of minorities for fear of economic - principally oil - retaliation. A second was the Cold War and the necessity of maintaining those Arab regimes involved in ethnic supremacy in the anti-Soviet camp. With the end of the Cold War, the 'peace process' became another factor causing the Christian communities to suffer international indifference. In the wake of the Camp David agreements (1979-80), a wave of governmental repression shook the Coptic community. Pope Shenouda was imprisoned, Coptic quarters in Cairo were under siege, and numbers of Christians were either jailed by the authorities or killed by Islamists. After the signing of the Oslo I and II agreements, Islamist attacks on Copts increased at an alarming rate. In the region, the 'peace process' was totally negative as far as the Christians were concerned. In Lebanon, Syria was granted a dominant role at the expense of the Christians as a way of inducing Damascus to sign a peace treaty with Israel. For years the last free enclave of Lebanon's Christians in the southern security zone was denied its right to resist and liberate its country for fear of upsetting President Assad. In Sudan and northern Iraq, similar reasons were forthcoming to prevent Western support for the Africans or Assyrians. However, the fundamental reason behind Western betrayal of the Christian minorities is ideological: it is the Arabists.76
Since the middle of this century, a pro-Arab lobby sympathizing with Arab nationalism has developed both in academia and in government circles. Later, Arabists became predominant in journalism. For decades, senior conceptualizers and field operatives of the US State Department simply rejected the existence of non-Arab, particularly non-Muslim, ethnic groups in the Middle East. Good relations with the 'Arab majority' meant neglect of the rights of the minorities in the region, concluded essayist Robert Kaplan.77 However, a recent surge of interest created in the West may yet mobilize
some support for the cause of Mideast Christians.78
1. On majority-minority relations. see Elie Kedourie. 'Ethnicity, majority and - minority in the Middle East', in Milton ~man and Itamar Rabinovitch (eds), Ethnicity, Pluralism and the State of the Middle East (Ithaca, Cornell University Press), pp. 25-31. On the attitude of Muslim intellectuals ,'is-Ii-vis the issue of non-Muslims in the Middle East. see P. J. Vatikiotis. Non-Mosle/ns in Moslem Society: A Preliminary Consideration of the Problem on the Basis of Recent Published Works by Muslim Authors (New York. Praeger. 1981). pp. 54-71.
2. On this topic see CEMAM reports. Religion. State and Ideology (Beirut. Center for the Study of the Moderm Arab World. St. Joseph University. 19761.
3. On regional powers and minority issues see Mordechai Nisan. Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Self-Expression (London. McFarland. 1991), pp.16-20.
4. See Lebanon Bulletin No.3 7. 15 August 1997
5. See Copts Magazine. New Jersey. June-July 1997.
6. See Sudan Gazette, London. Spring 1997.
7. These fears are based on perceptions by Mideast Christians that they are targeted for ethnic. cleansing. See the article 'No more Christians in the Middle East: the secret decisions taken at Lahore in 1980', Mashrek International, p. 33. The author wrote: 'by the year 2000 the Middle East will be Islamic and the Christians of the Orient and the Jews of Israel will be eliminated' (Mashrl'k International. December 1984).
8. On the subject see the comprehensive book by Jean Pierre Valognes, Vie et Mort des Chretienes d'Orient (Paris. Fayard. 1994).
9. For a global approach to the subject see Albert Hourani, The Minorities in the Arab World (London. Oxford University Press, 1947).
10. On the current demographic debate in Lebanon see statements by various Christian political forces, particularly the Maronite patriarch and the Union of Christian Leagues in AI-Nahar, AI-Anwar, AI-Diyar in June-July 1994. On the conflict over the concept of majority-minority in Lebanon see David MacDowall, Lebanon: A Conflict of Minorities (London. Minority Rights Group, 1981).
11. On the issues related to comparative figures see Robert Betts, Christians in the Arab East: A Political Study (Atlanta, John Knox Press, 1978); for a historical approach see Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society (New York. Holmes and Meier, 1982).
12. Interview with Lebanese historian Fuad Afram al-Bustany, Beirut, 12 February 1983.
13. Interview with Monsignor Dr Elias Hayek, President of the Aramaic Studies Association. Montreal. 22 February 1994.
14. On the location of churches and ethnic groups. see the comprehensive book by Valognes, p. 8. n. 8.
15. On the subject see Pierre Arbanieh's series of articles in AI-imberialiya al-Arabiya fil Mashrek [Arab Imperialism in the Orient] (Beirut, Manshurat al- Tagammoh. 1982).
16. In the case of Lebanon, see Michel Riquet. Une Millorite Chretienne: Les Maronites au Liban [A Christian Minority: The Maronites of Lebanon] (Geneva, Centre d'Information et de Documentation sur Ie Moyen-Orient, 1978).
17. On the subject see Walid Phares. 'There is no Christian Arab heritage. but a Christian participation in the Muslim Arab heritage' (Mashrek International. - Beirut. October 1984), p. 29.
18. A river between today's Syria and Jordan.
19. On the Arab-Muslim conquest of the Middle East, see Philip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs (New York, St Martins Press, 10th edn, 1974), pp. 139-147.
20. See Benjamin Braude and Bernard l£wis, eds, Christians and Jl'WS UI the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural society (New York, Holmes and Meier, 1982). See also C. E. Bosworth, 'The concept of Dhimma in early Islam', pp. 37-51; George Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement (New York, Putman, 1946), p, 15. See also Bat Ye'or, The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians Under Islam (London. Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1985);Le Dhimmii: Profil dl' /'Opprune en Oril'nt et l'n Afriqul' du Nord diplus la Conquite Arabe [The Dhimmi, Profile of the Oppressed in the Orient and North Africa from the Arab Conquest] (Paris, Anthropos, 1980).
21. Bat Ye'or. Les Chretientes d'Orient entre Jihad et Dhimmitude, 7eme-20 eme siecle [Christianities of the Orient between Jihad and Dhimmitude, 7th-20th Century] (Paris, Les Editions du Cerf, 1991).
22. For more on Islamization of the Middle East, see Peter Mansfield, 'From ancient to modem: introduction', in A History of the Middle East (New York. Viking, 1991), pp. 14-16.
23. See Ibn Warraq. 'Arab imperialism, Islamic colonialism', in his Why r,ll Not a Muslirn (New York, Prometheus Books, 1995). pp. 198-214.
24. On this period see David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peacl': The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modem Middle East (New York, Avon Books. 1989).
25. On this issue see Walid Phares, Al-Taadudya fi ulbnan [Pluralism in l£banon] (Kasleek, Lebanon, Holy Spirit University Press, 1979, Vol. 2).
26. On this period see Bat Ye'or, Les Chretientes. n. 21. 27. For a broad presentation of the situation of the Christians of the Middle East, see Betts, n. II.
28. On the Covenant of Umar and the concept of Jiziya see Bat Ye'or, Le Dllumlli, n. 20.
29. On historical resistance to the conquest, see Walid Phares, Lebanese Christian Nationalism: Thl' Rise and Fall of an Ethrlic Resistance (Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 1995). See also Manfred Lehmann, 'Oppression of Christians in Moslem countries', Allgemeiner, 24 February 1995.
30. See Joseph Naayem, Shell this Nation Die? (Chicago, Chaldean Revue House. 1920).
31. Al-Mas'ala al-Ashuriya [The Assyrian Question] (Beirut, Beit Nahrain Publica- tions, 1983). p. 3. Also AI-Qa\\lmiya al-Aramiya [Aramaic Nationalism]. lecture series by the Aramaic Front (Beirut, ACF. 1996).
32. On the subject see Valogones. op. cit., 'Syriaques', pp, 336-68 and 'Chaldeens'. pp. 406-50, n, 8.
33. See Albert Hourani, 'Iraq'. in Minorities in the Arab World, op. cit., pp. 99-103. 34. AI-Mas'ala al-Ashuriya, op. cit., p. 24.
35. See Valognes, op. cit., 'Irak', pp. 735-67. See also Walid Phares, 'Assyrian human rights', Assyrian Star, Vol. 49, No. I, April 1997: 'Two Assyrian Christians killed in Northern Iraq', Assyrian International News Agency, 12 February 1997.
36. In Tarikh al-Muqa\vama al-Qubtiya [The History of the Coptic Resistance], pre- pared by the Coptic Studies Committee, Lajnat Al-Dirassat al-Qubtiya (Beirut, Markaz aI-Dirassat Al-Qubtiya, 1984), pp. 1-16.
37. In Mansfield, op. cit., pp. 16, 22 n. 20.
38. See Thr Copts of Egypt: A Christian Minority (Geneva, Yahyia al Masrya, 1984).
39. See Shawki F. Karas, The Copts sincr the Arab Invasion: Strangers in Their Lands (Jersey City, NJ, American, Canadian and Australian Christian Coptic Associations, 1985). ch. 1.
40. For a detailed account of Coptic trends see Valognes, op. cit., 'L'Bgypte', pp. 527-66,
41. On this period and on the Coptic Congress and the various options see Dons Behrens-Abuseif, 'The political situation of the Copts: 1798-1923', in Braude and Lewis, op. cit., pp. 185-202.
42, In Tarikh al-Muqa\vama al-Qubtiya, op. cit" p. 30,
43. On Sadat's relations with the Coptic community see the series of articles on the 'Coptic question' by Walid Phares in AI-Ahrar (May-June 1980): and a series of articles on 'Egypt's Copts' in Al-Maruni (March-June 1980),
44. On the Coptic opposition movement see publications of the World Coptic Association (Jersey City) and publications of the American Coptic Association, 1991.
45. See 'Heaviest cross for Bgypt's Copts: March of Islam', Nrw York Times, 27 July 1992.
46. See 'Fanatic journalist demands that Coptic Church leadership deny existence of persecution'. Mideast News"'ire, 16 July 1997.
47. See 'Egypt Briefing Report', report on fact-finding trip to Egypt, British MP David Alton, The Copts, Vol. 22, No.1. January 1995. See also John Eibner, Church Under Siege (London, Washington, DC: Institute for Religious Minorities in the Islamic World, 1993), pp. 36-41.
48. See Salim Naguib, 'Ila mata' [Until when], TIle Copts, Vol. 23, No.4, October 1996.
49. See 'Islamist gunmen massacre Christians in an Bgyptian monastery'. New York Times, 12 March 1994. See also 'Two Copts killed in Upper Egypt', Rruttr, 6 September 1997: 'World Coptic Association calls on world opinion to intervene', Midrast Newswirr, 12 September 1997: 'Christians attacked in Egypt after Virgin Mary sighting', Reuter, AFP, Midrast Newswire, 14 September 1997.
50. See Francis Mading Deng, 'The identity factor in the Sudanese factor', in Joseph V. Montville, ed., Cof!f1ict and Peacrnlaking irl Multi-ethnic Societirs (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990).
51. In 'Mas'alat Tanoub ai-Sudan' [The Question 01' South Sudan] in the research reports of the Lijna Mashriqiya [Mashrek Committee] (Beirut, 1986), p. 3.
52. See Nelson Kasfir, 'Peacemaking and social cleavages in Sudan', in Joseph V. Montville, op. cit., pp. 370-71,
53. For a historical review of the south Sudan conflict see Riek Machar, 'The Sudan conflict: The SPLM/SPLA-United calls on America to support the people of South - Sudan in their struggle for self-determination, national liberation and independence in the Sudan' (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 12 April 1994).
54. See 'Government captures major cities', New York Times. 19 July 1992. 55. See Mideast Ne\\'swire, 15 December 1993.
56. See report on refugees in pan-Arab daily AI-Hayat, 14 December 1993. See also 'Church burning part of Holy War in Sudan says anti-slavery group in Wash- ington', Mideast Newswire, 3 August 1997.
57, See 'Report on South Sudan' (Macomb, Illinois, and Loughborough, UK: Middle East Collcern, 20 August 1993): see also various documents of the Sudanese Popular liberation Movement (SPLM)/United (Nairobi, 1994), and bulletins of the SPLA in January-March 1997, confirmed by Reuter, AFP, and AP news agencies. More recently, 'The SPLA claims two towns over the Islamists', Mideast Newswire, 2 August 1997.
58. See Valognes, op. cit., 'Maronites'. pp. 336-68, n. 8.
59. On this period see Butros Oaou. The History of the Marolutes (Beirut, Oar el- Nahar, 1976. 1979).
60. See Habib Malik, 'The future of Christian Arabs'. Mediterraneall Quarterly, Vol. 2, Spring 1991, pp, 78-79.
61, On the Syrian domination of Lebanon's institutions after Taef implementation, see Ronald McLaurin, 'Lebanon into or out of oblivion?', Current History, Vol, 91, No. 561 (January 1992). p. 32: on the signature of a 'Brotherhood Treaty of Security and Cooperation between Imanon and Syria' and the implementation of Taef accord, see 'Le Liban Independant n'est plus' [Independent Lebanon is gone]. in Tribune d'Orient, Vol. 104, 1-7 June 1991. p. 1.
62. See 'Syrian security services arrest Christian opposition members in the Bekaa', Conlpass News Service, 13 September 1996.
63. See 'Hizbollah massacre Christian children in Jezzine', Lebanoll Bulletin, 18 August 1997.
64. See the statement by Maronite Bishop Beshara al-Rahi, 'Lebanon has lost its freedom and sovereignty' (Los Angeles: Kamal Shamas, AI-Hayat, 25 June 1994). See also 'Beirut government censures the Maronite Patriarch speeches', in Ai-Hayat, AI-Nahar, AI-Allwar, 1-10 February 1994.
65. Walid Phares. 'The Mideast underdogs', Jerusalenl Post, 23 June 1992. On the Lebanese Christian Resistance, see Walid Phares, Lebanese Christian Resistance, op. cit.. pp. 179-211.
66. See Valognes, op. cit., 'Israel', pp. 566-614, 'Jordanie', pp. 614-36, n. 8.
67. See 'Middle East Christian Committee seeks autonomy within Palestinian Mus- lim autonomy'. Mideast Ne\vswire, 19 August 1994.
68, See 'PLO persecute a Christian Palestinian'. Mideast Newswire, 18 July 1997.
69. See Kamal Salameh, 'Middle East Christians to world Christians: Defend the Holy Sepulture in Jerusalem from Islamist assault', Mideast Newswire, 14 April 1997.
70. See Haim Shapiro, 'Christian-Moslem dispute escalates', Jerusalem Post, 14 February 1997, See also an interesting investigation by the Jerusalem Report on 'Turan's incidents in the Galilee'. 24 June 1997.
71. 'Evangelical leaders assassinated in Iran', MidEast Newswire, 5 July 1994.
72. See 'Christians detained in Iran', 24 February 1997 (Iranian Christians Inter- national, 74521.230@compuserve.com).
73. See hearings on persecution of Mideast Christians by the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee of the US Senate: Congressman Wolf, Bat Ye'or, Nina Shea, Walid Phares. Congressional Records, 29 April 1997.
74, See 'Two Philippino Christians beheaded in Saudi Arabia, Catholic ~ague of the Middle East calls on Pope to declare them Saints', Mideast Newswire, 18 July 1997. See also A. M. Rosenthal editorials in the New York Times in particular 'The City and the Kingdom', 17 June 1997,
75. On Turkey, see Valognes, op. cit., pp, 796-832, 76, This fear was raised by Mideast Christians in the 1980s. See 'Towards the establishment of an International Secretariat for the Christians of the Near East', Mashrek lIIterllatiollal, December 1984.
77, Interview with State Department official, Alberto Fernandez, in Robert D, Kaplan, 'Tales from the bazaar', In Atlantic Monthly (August 1992); also in Kaplan's The Arabists (New York, Free Press, 1995), p. 306. See also Roger Dufour, 'International campaign to destroy the Christian cause', Mashrek International January 1985.
78. See Ralph Kinney Bennet, .The global war on Christians', Reader's Digest, August 1997; also Peter Stelnfels, 'Evangelicals lobby for oppressed Christians', New York Times, 15 September 1996; Larry Witham. 'Christians press to end persecution', Washillgtoll Times, 17 January 1997. See also State Department briefing on US policies in support of religious freedom overseas, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, John Shattuck (State Department, 22 July 1997).