The American Jewish Committee

Weekly Briefing on Israeli and Middle Eastern Affairs

As the Shadow of War Falls upon Us: Fears and Hopes

Generals were once notorious for always trying to fight the previous war. As I have come to observe, this is no longer true: Modern officers are taught to turn their forces into “learning organizations,” ever adjusting to change. This will soon be demonstrated in the struggle to unseat Saddam Hussein. Israeli civilians, on the other hand, seem to be psychologically conditioned to expect a repeat of the 1991 Scud missile campaign, even if the experts are again and again making the point that this will be an entirely different affair.

In 1991, much of the wrath fell upon Ramat Gan, a Tel Aviv suburb (which has been notable since the 1950s for its high concentration of Iraqi immigrants). Now it is the mayor of Ramat Gan who leads the way in planning for an organized evacuation “once the missiles start falling”—as if the six-week nightmare were about to happen again.

It is not. This is, in fact, not a regular war at all, in which Saddam, while defending one sector (as in Kuwait in 1991) will be free to turn his energies elsewhere, in an attempt to change the strategic balance and drag us—and other Arab nations—into the conflict. This is more an armed political intervention, a revolution or coup carried out by American arms, designed to bring down the foul and murderous Ba’athist regime and offer the long-suffering Iraqis something better— indeed, almost anything, other than rule by Saddam’s even more pathological sons, would be better. The familiar pattern in such conflicts is not the long, painful bloodletting of two nations fighting each other (as in the cases of Iran and Iraq, 1981-89; or the Palestinians and ourselves), but rather the sudden shift of internal loyalties that comes when the dictator’s hold on power begins to collapse and people within the power structures—the military, the administrative bodies, the intelligence agencies— scramble to find a place with the victors.

Thus, the actions of the allies will be felt very quickly everywhere in Iraq, with the regime reduced, in all likelihood, to some besieged quarters of Baghdad, which might hold out for a while. What we should be seriously worried, or at least concerned, about is not so much the war itself—almost all the apocalyptic speculations in the Western media are based on political views, uninformed by any real knowledge of the Iraqi situation—but rather the potential chaos of the “day after,” when manipulative and often vengeful Iraqi factions will try to drag U.S. troops and administrators into their power games. The move toward democratization in Iraq and elsewhere in the region will need to be careful and gradual.

In essence, the term “democratization” implies three different stages: 

1.      Breaking the power and hold of totalitarians, dictators, and their friends— from Saddam on to Arafat, Hizballah, and their sponsors;

2.      Giving the institutions of civil society and the forces of the market an opportunity to take hold and grow, in an environment marked by the rule of law and the stability of the social infrastructure, as opposed to a false stability based on repression and totalitarian fantasies;

3.      Only then, as conditions mature, moving on to the emergence of multiparty politics and the prospect of democratic transitions of power.

            Thus, there is much that could go wrong, over a relatively long period of time. Yet this is preferable, much preferable, to the certain prospects of catastrophe implicit in the current state of affairs in Iraq and in the region. If Saddam is not removed from power, the only way to prevent him from surging forward with his military ambitions would be to starve his country (and, tragically, his people) of all resources. Those who abhor the war, understandably, because of what it might do to Iraqi civilians, should stop and consider what might happen to those self-same civilians if the war to remove Saddam is delayed.

            Moreover, the reassertion of American power in the Middle East is already showing useful results, opening new avenues, building an architecture of authority in the region that will encourage its leaders to move toward a better future. In the last week alone we saw further signs of the Egyptians’ interest in a dialogue with Sharon; a meeting between the second most important Palestinian leader, Abu Alaa’, and Sharon in the latter’s office, which might soon lead to the resumption of certain joint security measures; talk about the appointment of the Palestinian finance minister, Salam Fayyad, held in high regard by the Israeli government, as the first executive prime minister of the Palestinian Authority, taking away Arafat’s real power; and the Saudis, stung by so much criticism and keen to regain some ground with the U.S.,  promoting a draft document about the need for reform and transparency in Arab governance. Not a bad crop for a week—even if our war is far from over. (An Israeli officer was killed this week in Bethlehem, six soldiers in all lost in recent weeks, and a huge number of suicide bombings attempted, but foiled.)