The American Jewish Committee

The Arab World in Disarray and the New Charges against Iran: What Can It Mean for Israel?

As the intervention in Iraq draws near, and the invective keeps cascading across the Atlantic—from “the Axis of weasels” on one side to the crass, disparaging descriptions of the “Texas cowboy” on the other—it is important, and not just amusing, to turn our attention to the acrimonious exchanges that have in recent weeks torn apart the Arab world. (Is it still a “world?” Yes, insofar as new communications media such as Al-Jazeera have reconnected it. No, if that term implies any unity of purpose.)

At the Arab League meeting, it was the Libyan leader who reopened old wounds by accusing Saudi Arabia of collaborating with the United States in 1991, which prompted an angry outburst from the Saudis: “Your grave awaits you and your lies walk with you.” At the Organization of Islamic Countries summit in Qatar, on the other hand, it was the Iraqis, represented by Saddam’s red-headed henchman, Izzat al-Duri, who squared off against the Kuwaitis: “A curse upon your moustache, you Mossad agent! Monkey! Traitor!” They tilted back at the “barbarian,” and walked out in protest. In both cases, the virulent public outbursts were just the tip of the iceberg. Arab tensions, and indeed disunity and disarray, are clearly the predominant pattern in inter-Arab affairs at the moment of American decision. The Arabs, lamented the young president of Syria (whose country might be described as the representative of the sponsors of terrorism in the UN Security Council), are not even able to unite around a neutral position.

Unlike France or Germany, the key Arab countries—whether U.S. “friends,” like Egypt or Saudi Arabia, or open foes, like Syria or Libya—cannot afford to ignore the forceful message implicit in the impending American action. The region is about to go places, and the Arab states are squabbling over the bus tickets. They know who the legal vendors are. The crisis over hegemony in the rarified air of the UN does not—cannot—be translated into real alternatives for the Arab players, in the sense that the Soviets offered alternatives until the late ’80s. Europe is still too much a divided abstraction for it to serve as a counterbalance to U.S. power in the Middle East, which rests on a firm military foundation, as well as on economic and “soft” power (such as popular culture, predominance in cyberspace).

Arafat, as he proved again this week, may still roll a list of supporters off his lips—the EU, Russia, China, Japan, the nonaligned, Asia and Africa, the UN—as he did in the ’90s, but even he ultimately knows where his bread used to be buttered. (Hence his dejected complaint that he had fallen upon hard times with the Bush administration, through no fault of his own, while support for Israel remains high.)

American policy, therefore, remains the key to the future of the region. For the Gulf States—not Kuwait only, but all are now on board—as well as for Jordan, the choice is clear. For others, the dilemmas are now becoming acute; in fact, most of them have crossed over the line into active support of U.S. military deployment (even if they plan to stay out of the actual fighting). This, in turn, implies that it would be a disaster for them if the United States now turned tail and left them to Saddam’s tender mercies, as France (and Blix) suggest. Some of the toughest statements from Washington in recent days may well have been meant to steady the fraying nerves of the Kuwaitis, Jordanians, Saudis, and even Egyptians, for whom the survival in power of a vengeful Saddam, who surely is aware of their levels of cooperation with the U.S. military, is the worst possible outcome.

To understand what this Arab disarray might mean for our future, it is necessary to check the balance sheet, country by country. What conclusions can the key regional players draw from this debacle?

1.      For the Palestinian leadership—more specifically, Arafat and his clique—this disintegration of the Arab lineup in the face of pending American action (and ongoing Israeli operations) spells the failure of the tragic strategic gamble they have forced upon us, and upon their own people, since September 2000. At the time, Palestinian TV popularized a Lebanese song, “Where Are the Millions [of angry Arabs]”—but the millions did not join the struggle, nor did their governments or armed forces. The chain reaction did not happen; the region did not explode, nor appears likely to do so. The “militarized Intifada” (to use their term) proved to be a disastrous choice.

 The appointment, to the new office of prime minister, of Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazin), a man who grew to understand that the “revolution” cannot succeed, might yet prove to be the watershed. While defending on principle the Palestinians’ right to “resist,” he has more than once said in recent months that the time has come to face the music: The violence did not pay off, and should stop. Can he do it? Not yet, and certainly not alone. Do not expect miracles—but if a strong man is chosen to serve in his cabinet as interior minister (in effect, as the boss of all the security services), he has a fighting chance of bringing the terrorist organizations to heel (with the help of relentless Israeli pressure).

2.      Syria continues to take a hard-edged anti-American position, but Bashar Assad’s bark might be worse than his bite. Israel is taking some precautions and sending out deterrent messages (backed by a very robust military capability) against the possibility that Hizballah in Lebanon would be given a Syrian green light to attack Israeli targets; and there are strong indications that the other side is listening. Indeed, Hassan Nasrallah, the Hizballah leader, has actually warned the Palestinians not to be tempted:  better to live and fight another day. This is clearly the advice he gives himself as well, and a stern Syrian warning may well be behind it. As early as April 2002, the Egyptians had warned Assad that if he tries to drag them into conflict, as Syria did in 1967, he will find himself very much on his own. He can be under no illusion that their reaction would be any different today.

3.      Jordan stands to gain, perhaps more than any other country in the region (except Kuwait) from the removal of Saddam and the quick reopening of the Iraqi economy. For various reasons, it is well placed to be the key conduit for the immense relief and reconstruction effort in Iraq, and already one can sense that the popular anti-American sentiments in Amman are tinged with a sense of anticipation of a “postwar dividend.” Israel has been the enabling factor in the transition of Jordan from the Iraqi column, where the Hashemite monarchy was held against its will in 1990-91, to the pro-American side (indeed, the friendliest of all Arab regimes): This will be reflected in the future balance of relations.

4.      Egypt, on the other hand, remains difficult vis-à-vis Israel (Mubarak has now withdrawn his invitation to Sharon) and will need to be kept under steady pressure, if we want to see any follow-up to the earlier signs of a sobering up (such as Usama Al-Baz’s denunciation of the “Protocols,” the mission to the U.S., which included a meeting with AJC). Still, they will claim to have done their share—by allowing U.S. shipping through the Suez Canal, and by shifting the direction of the inner-Arab debate and pinning the blame on Saddam—to deserve American attention to their needs after the war. Whether they will actually gain a free ride in Washington (where eyebrows might be raised as to what the United States has bought with this immense package) is still an open question.

5.      Saudi “reform?” For their part, the Saudis (or rather, a core of American- educated men in key positions) have come to realize that their own long and wild free ride in American public opinion is definitely over. The attempts to put political “reform” on the agenda of the Arab League; the emerging debate over the call, by some 150 prominent Saudis, for an elected shura (consultative assembly) and equal rights for women (!) all indicate, as did Crown Prince Abdallah’s initiative a year ago, that the kingdom, which has now reopened to the deployment of U.S. ground troops, already seeks to find its place in the new regional system.

6.      The Arab “collective”--Is it still there? At the end of the day, as the debate on the future of Arab democratization intensifies, an interesting pattern emerges. Countries that still hope to see the Arab world united, and thus returned to its former glory (with the destruction of Israel as a happy corollary) are the least likely to get into the serious tasks of social, economic, and political change and liberalizations. Those who cast aside the fantasies of yesteryear are in a much better position to join up with the dynamics of the twenty-first century. The evolving Iraqi situation will closely reflect this ideological divide.   

            Israel stands to benefit—not without very difficult decisions and adjustments of our own—if the lot of all Arabs is bettered by more pragmatic and more liberal governments, including Abu Mazin’s. Yet all this could be put at risk if an alternative vision—Islamic revolution—steps up to replace what it was that Saddam had stood for. Iran could, at least theoretically, emerge as the manipulative winner of this crisis. This is why it is now important to watch for the long-term effects of two major developments that have already put Iran on the defensive and might curb the revolutionary mullahs’ appetite for adventures in the postwar Middle East:

·        The revelation by the Iranian opposition as to the nuclear facilities in Natanz and elsewhere (known to Western intelligence services for some time), which Iran tried to mitigate by inviting the International Atomic Energy Agency and its director, Mohamed El-Baradei, to visit the sites, but not (yet) by signing on to the so-called “93+2” protocols of intensified nuclear inspection. This is the beginning of a long and complex chapter.

·        The indictments in Argentina of four Iranians, including the former minister of intelligence, Ali Falahian, for the multiple murders at the AMIA is a case as serious as, and much more directly linked to the highest authorities than, the case against Libya over Lockerbie.