The American Jewish Committee

To Make Proper Use of the “Road Map,”  We Should Fix It, Not Fight It

A Special Report on Israeli and Middle Eastern Affairs April 2, 2003

(Based on talks to AJC professional leaders, March 26-27, in Israel)

Dr. Eran Lerman

Director Israel/Middle East Office

          A major turning point in the Middle East peace negotiating process may be in sight, but we still have some time. The real struggle over the “road map” is not yet upon us, at least for a few weeks.

·        Moreover, until the Iraqi regime does crumble—which could happen soon, but this is not yet the way things look to most Arabs—it is not the time for Abu Mazen to travel to Washington. At this point in time, Arafat’s propaganda chief, Yasir Abed Rabbo, denigrates all things American (or British), and at demonstrations in Gaza, and even in Umm al-Fahm within Israel proper, crowds shout “Ya Saddam, ya habib, udrub, udrub Tal Abib” (Saddam, our favored one, hit Tel Aviv). This is hardly a good time for Abu Mazen to be seen embracing an American design.

            What should Israel do during this short period until the challenge is upon us? Some in the far right, including Sharon’s coalition partners Avigdor Lieberman (National Union) and Efraim Eitam (National Religious Party), argue forcefully that this is the time to take a stand against any Palestinian state. In more reasoned terms, so do Benyamin Netanyahu and Natan Sharansky—more about their positions later. They feel, moreover, that it is possible to find effective allies in the United States who would support Israeli needs.

            They may well be right about the prospects for counteraction: After all, there is a limit to how much Israel, or the United States, should feel obliged to do, so as to help Tony Blair solve his problems with the rabidly anti-Zionist and anti-American voices within his own Labor Party (one of whom has recently, on an Arab TV station, described the Coalition forces as “a pack of wolves” attacking poor, helpless Iraq). Yet the push and pull of U.S.–British relations must not blur (spell that “Blair”…) the real issue: It is the “road” which really matters, not the “map”; and most Israelis, and apparently most Palestinians (if Khalil Shiqaqi’s polls are to be trusted) are, in fact, looking for a road that can somehow take them out of the present sad and messy reality. This is now within the realm of possibility, when (there should be no “if’s” about it) American arms do prevail in Baghdad.

            For a road map based on the present draft to do what needs to be done— namely, to create a “window of opportunity” for a return to the negotiating table—it needs to be fixed and made to fit more closely with President Bush’s speech. It need not be fought “every inch of the way.” There is much in it that is useful:

1.      To begin with, we should welcome a CIA-monitored regime that would seriously oblige the new Palestinian cabinet—with security chief Muhammad Dahlan as the real operator, whatever his formal title—to deal with terrorism. This would mean, on the strategic level, to restrain Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad activities, and to bring the secular movements—Fatah’s Al-Aqsa Brigades, the PFLP, and some smaller groups—under effective control; and down on the ground, to arrest, interrogate, put on trial, and punish all unruly elements. It can happen: Already we have seen, for the first time since 2001, a meeting of Major General Doron Almog, the Israeli commanding officer for the Southern Command, and his counterpart in Gaza, working to resume security cooperation; and within the Israeli intelligence community, both the DMI and the GSS (military intelligence and domestic security—Shabak—respectively), there is a sense of expectation as to what Abu Mazen might be able, and perhaps even willing, to accomplish, given his strongly held opinion that Arafat’s choice for violence has been a disaster. “Some people try to make it look as if we would be tearing our hair out, if Abu Mazen acts against terror [and Israel is asked to reciprocate],” said Sharon’s chief of staff last week. “Nothing could be further from the truth.”

2.      Moreover, Israel has a vested interest in allowing Palestinian reforms to move forward and already gives extensive backing to the finance minister, Salam Fayyad, not because he gets 100 percent results—Arafat, playing his own money games, keeps hampering his efforts and going over his head—but because he is seen to be making an honest effort to prevent corruption and the diversion of funds to terrorist purposes. We have every reason in the world—moral, political, diplomatic, and military—to promote policies that would make the bulk of the Palestinian population more prosperous and happy. Some developments, particularly in terms of the levels of employment, are already well felt: After all, some 250 million shekels (in back payment for taxes on work in Israel) are now flowing into Fayyad’s coffers every month.

3.      Looking beyond Stage I, there are benefits (as well as serious risks) in the emergence of a Palestinian state, within provisional borders. In terms of its impact on Israel’s standing in the world, a conflict with a sovereign state (such as Syria) over disputed territory is a much more legitimate situation to be in, than the prolonged “subjugation” of a stateless people. A so-called Provisional Palestinian State would take the “colonialist” poison out of our relations with those in Europe for whom this has become the dominant paradigm for interpretation of the conflict, and in many ways, a similar effect would be welcome within the Israel public itself.

4.      Ultimately, the very process of political separation (coupled with a physical separation—the fence) is now recognized by most Israelis as necessary and healthy. When pressed by some of his own ministers recently about the contours of the fence—why not push it further east?— Sharon made it very clear that he is not only reconciled to the notion of partition, which once had been abhorred by Likud; he is also keen to draw the line so as to avoid unnecessary incorporation of Palestinian villages west of the separation line. Demographics, social dynamics, economics, moral, and diplomatic consequences: all point in the same direction. If the “road map” helps us draw a map—a “line in the sand”—so be it.

            Still, the draft is not without some serious problems, and there is no justification for the British/Arab/U.S. State Department “linkage line,” or for the tough stand against any modification of the text. In talks with knowledgeable Israelis last week, five different principled objections to the “road map” emerged:

1.      The security establishment—the IDF and others—fear that the “process” would again take over, at the expense of substance, and that artificial timetables, not performance-based judgment, would drive it. This can be fixed by rewriting the text, or else, by trusting the United States, and the U.S. alone, to hold the steering wheel.

2.      The political leadership—Sharon in particular—dislikes the attempts to define in advance the outcome of the process, by using a set of previous “terms of reference” which the Arab side might read as affirming their  interpretation of UNSCR 242. The Saudi initiative, also mentioned, further feeds unrealistic Palestinian expectations that cannot be met. Again, strong Israeli-U.S. understandings could be used to finesse this issue, for a while –but this time Washington must not wait until after the last moment, as it did in Camp David in 2000, to tell the Palestinians that they, too, cannot get 100 percent of what they want.

3.      Netanyahu and intellectuals close to him raise a more profound objection, which is likely to appear on any set of suggested Israeli “contributions,” but is not quite likely to be endorsed by Washington: namely, that in return for recognizing a fully sovereign Palestinian state, as early as Stage II, Israel should demand an early recognition, not simply of her right to exist, but of her right to be a Jewish state—a point already made by Secretary of State Powell in his Louisville speech in March 2002. This should serve as a dam against future demands based on the so-called “right of return.” The trouble with such an Israeli stance is that Abu Mazen is not yet nearly as strong as he would need to be to make this concession now, against Arafat’s position and the claim of much of the Arab world, including a recent statement by the president of Syria, that Israel will never be legitimate, even if peace treaties will be signed. This is a deal breaker; it should be reserved for the point at which real Israeli concessions— evacuation of some settlements?—will be on the table from our side.

4.      Natan Sharansky raises a deeper concern: Before we feel comfortable in offering important concessions, a much more profound transformation toward democracy is needed in the Palestinian system—not just the replacement of a terrorist with a Soviet-trained apparatchik. Mechanisms of civil society and political accountability, not revolutionary mobilization and/or effective repression, should be in place. Their extent would then determine how much we could be comfortable in conceding to the Palestinians. This is a valid point, and should be explained to the United States, and kept in reserve for later stages; but it would be wrong, perhaps, to raise it too early in the process as a reason to do nothing now.

5.      Much the same can be said for the argument raised against the “road map” from the other side of the political divide—as Labor MK Ephraim Sneh put it, that you cannot have a map if your “road” goes to two very different places—in other words, that some prior agreement on ultimate (permanent status) goals should be in place before we start.