Sharon’s Cabinet Votes to Comply with the Practical Aspects of the “Road Map”: The Right Decision, If (and only if) We All Stand Guard against Erosion on Key Issues

by Dr. Eran Lerman

Director, Israel/Middle East Office

American Jewish Committee

The Israeli Cabinet on Sunday endorsed the practicalities of the “road map,” without committing itself to early declaratory steps or the problematic “terms of reference.” The vote, which gave Prime Minister Ariel Sharon a sufficiently comfortable margin, broke down as follows:

• Twelve voted for the plan: the prime minister himself and six other of his fourteen Likud ministers, including the important voice of Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz; as well as all five Shinui ministers, proving again that Shinui is a coherent party, radically liberal on religion, clearly conservative on the economy, and firmly centrist on the Palestinians.
• Seven voted against: the two National Union (nationalist) and two National Religious Party ministers, as well as Likud hard-liners Uzi Landau, Yisrael Katz, and Natan Sharansky (whose Yisrael Be’Aliya Party is now part of Likud and who feels strongly that we have drifted a long way from the original Bush vision and must wait for real Palestinian democracy first).
• Four preferred to abstain: “Bibi” Netanyahu, until recently a fierce enemy of any willingness to accept a Palestinian state, but now more attentive to American concerns; and three other Likud ministers—Limor Livnat, the minister of education and, like Bibi, the daughter of devout Jabotinsky supporters; Internal Security Minister Tzachi Hanegbi, the son of Geula Cohen, the “Pasionaria” of the nationalist right in Israel; and the youngest member of the Cabinet, Minister of Health Dani Naveh. It will be their conduct from now on—uncomfortable acquiescence or active obstructionism—that will determine how broad Sharon’s margin for maneuver will be as we navigate the roads outlined in the map.

Sharon’s achievement does not alter—least of all in the prime minister’s own mind—the judgment that the document we have now signed on to (in its practical parts) is a seriously flawed piece of work. The Bush Administration implicitly accepted this claim when it gave Israel a commitment to take Israel’s reservations “fully” into account. The “road map”:

1.      Is almost fatally murky on the key permanent status questions: the need for a territorial compromise, already mentioned by President Bush (“41”) in Madrid, in October 1991, but rarely repeated since; and the crucial issue of the so-called “right of return,” which could prove to be the deal-breaker once again.

2.      Does not fully spell out the necessary conditions for international and Israeli recognition of a sovereign Palestinian state: parallel recognition of Israel as a sovereign Jewish state; demilitarization; a truly new and reformed leadership, not just a repackaging of Arafat’s power; and an active Arab role in building the peace.

3.      Remains problematic on timetables and performance-based criteria for progress—not least because the monitoring mechanism involves judgments by Europeans and others who are eager to rush forward to a Palestinian state, no matter what happens;

4.      Contains morally repugnant language implying equivalence between the perpetrators of hideous terrorism, and those who are fighting to defeat it—to the point of demanding an end to “Israeli incitement” against the Palestinians.

And yet—for all these faults, and others—the Cabinet decision, which for the first time since 1967 (ironically, given this Cabinet’s political color) formally endorsed the prospect of partition and a Palestinian state, may well prove to be a fruitful turning point in our history. Two sets of reasons are at work:

• To begin with, if only by elimination, most other options are worse. On the far right, there are those who advocate “transfer,” the removal of Arabs across borders or the perpetuation of their unequal and disenfranchised status. Quite aside from moral issues, this is one sure way of sending Israel deeper and deeper into international isolation, until the day comes when even our best friends will no longer be able (or willing) to help us. On the far left, meanwhile, there are some who advocate giving in to all Palestinian demands; others are reconciled to Zionism becoming submerged within “a state of all her citizens” (“democratic and secular,” which means Islamic and dictatorial). Again, moral issues arise—and equally forcefully—given the right of all peoples not to be driven to death or suicide.  Thus, we are left with the need to separate and become two states.
• Many in Israel on the sober center-left have come to the conclusion this should be done unilaterally (which yet might happen, if this move fails). Sharon has not. He has opted for an agreed interim arrangement, and put his trust—even if he would rather appear to his own constituency to have been coerced—in the prospect of a forceful American intervention, in the wake of  Saddam’s overthrow, leading to this desired halfway station. At the end of the day, this preference clearly rests upon his sense that he can trust Bush—and the special relationship with the United States, which reflects common interests, common values, and the influence of organized American Jewry.

It is therefore now the task of Israel’s friends in America (and beyond) to stand guard so as to ensure that Arab and European pressures do not lead to further erosion of Bush’s original vision. Above all, we need to see:

1.      Extensive, effective actions to put an end to terrorism as a tool of policy, in the Palestinian Authority, as well as in Syria and Iran.

2.      Insistence on performance-based sequences, based on U.S. judgments alone.

3.      Further action to ensure (contrary to recent European actions) that Arafat’s hand is truly removed from all levers of power.