For the Summitry to Succeed, There Must Be Real Action to Reshape the Regional Dynamics

AJC Weekly Briefing on Israeli and Middle Eastern Affairs

May 29, 2003

Dr. Eran Lerman

Director, Israel/Middle East Office

American Jewish Committee

This is the week of summits—first came the second Ariel Sharon-Mahmoud Abbas meeting, again in Jerusalem, already described by both sides as quite successful. Setting aside the futile debates about this or that formulation of words, they focused on the war on terrorism (with Abu Mazen very explicit about his intention to collect illegal weapons, not just negotiate a temporary ceasefire—“hudna” in Arabic, a word which carries the connotation of a feinted truce in order to regroup) and reciprocal Israeli measures: relaxing the siege, granting 25,000 new work permits in Israel for Palestinian workers, various humanitarian measures, and the release of some Palestinian prisoners. A clear sense of hope is in the air, and in conjunction with the Knesset approval of Benyamin Netanyahu’s economic plan—a nine billion shekel cut in public spending—it was translated within a few days into a massive bullish rally on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange.

Soon to follow will be the summit between President Bush and the two prime ministers (with King Abdullah of Jordan, acting as their host) in Aqaba; and finally, Bush with key Arab “moderates,” led by another—envious and competitive—host, President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, in Sharm al-Sheikh. An impressive launch party for the “road map” process: But despite the tremendous impact of American authority in this post-Saddam era, we still stand in some danger of finding ourselves again in dangerous and murky waters, of being trapped in the same cycle of frustration and failure that we saw in the anno horribilis of the peace process, 2000, and ever since.

To prevent this from happening, the positions taken by the United States (we can hope for little from the rest of the world) must be clear, sharp, unambiguously delivered, and backed by a watchful intelligence eye and a steady operational hand.  Will Washington prove equal to this challenge? One thing should be forcefully stated: Never, in recent history, has the role of American Jewry been as important as it is now. This is the time for AJC and all other Jewish defense organizations to do everything that needs to be done to ensure—for the benefit of all—that these vital inputs, properly balanced, become central to U.S. policy in the Middle East.

Reward those who move forward; punish and destroy those who would drag us back into the abyss; educate those who do not understand—these are the simple essentials. In the ’90s, too much emphasis was put on the first element, the carrot, relying on the economic benefits of peace—while the other two were left largely unattended. We have paid a terrible price for this well-meant “benign” neglect. Thus, to secure a better future, it is necessary—but simply not enough—to rebuild Iraq and to lavish funds on the reconstruction of the Palestinian economy. It is equally vital to present a robust set of requirements with regard to the other aspects of the regional balance:

1.      The terrorists themselves must face certain, if not always swift, retribution: in other words, the possibility of a hudna may be acceptable as an initial measure—while the new Palestinian government puts its house in order—but then, Abu Mazen’s fine words must take the shape of a comprehensive plan to put an end to the existence of armed organizations outside the scope of the central authority.

2.      It is time for the Palestinians to stop playing with declaratory steps, unless they are willing to offer one of their own: recognizing Israel as a Jewish state. Instead Abu Mazen must focus his attention on a real plan to fight Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the other murderers—including those within his own movement, Fatah, who refuse to lay down their arms. This would need to be a better plan than the one already presented by Palestinian Internal Security Minister Mohammad Dahlan to the Americans, and quickly rejected as inadequate.

3.      If Arafat, through the Fatah command structures, continues to work behind the scenes to undo all that “his” prime minister hopes to achieve, the time could come, and soon, for the United States and Israel—and even others in the international community. (Arafat’s man at the UN, his nephew Nasser al-Qidwa, is now complaining that the UN envoy, Terje Larsen, “meddles in Palestinian politics” by sharply criticizing the boss.)

4.      Meanwhile, steady pressure must be put on Syria, Iran, and the other sponsors and hosts of the various terror syndicates. The rahbar (supreme leader or guide) of Iran, Ali Khamenei, should face the consequences of his complicity in mass murder, as implied in the recent Argentinean indictments (for which AJC and others have worked tirelessly for so long). The era of the free-roaming terrorist must come to an end in the Middle East.

·        An end to the virulence of the Arab public domain. On this matter, it is not the “Axis of Evil” but rather America’s traditional friends, the Saudis and, even more so, the Egyptians, who should finally be treated to an equally unambiguous message: The way they educate their children; the way they allow their media to slide into the vilest forms of Jew-baiting; the pervasive anti-Americanism of their public domain and their academic circles—all are at the root of much that has gone wrong. The problem must be dealt with now, not at the “end of days.” In this regard, it is extremely important that the Sharm summit not degenerate into a mutual adoration club. If it does, and the incitement continues, it will be up to AJC and like-minded people, addressing the American public, the media, and the U.S. Congress, to make clear that these familiar patterns of hate carry a painful price for their practitioners.

The need to think clearly cuts both ways. This week Prime Minister Sharon—to the open dismay of many in his own Likud Party, let alone his far- right partners—addressed the controversial, but supremely relevant, concept of the “occupation.” We need not—indeed, should not—feel as occupiers in lands which historically are part of our ancestral homeland: Indeed, in some “disputed” areas—Jerusalem and, to some extent, the Golan Heights—we have already ended the formal state of “belligerent occupation” (a morally neutral term that now applies as well to the U.S. role in Iraq) by annexing them to Israel, or applying our laws.

 At the same time, it is impossible to ignore the fact that the Palestinians themselves, 3.5 million of them by Sharon’s own count, see themselves as an occupied people: a subjective but powerful sentiment, which at the end of the day can only be addressed by pushing them out, or holding them down, or incorporating them into a unified state (all of which options would prove to be the moral and strategic equivalent of suicide), or else, by finding a way to separate from them, on our own terms. This is the historic mission that Sharon has now taken upon himself (backed by a clear majority of Israelis) to try to achieve, with the help of a firm and decisive American hand.