Will the “Hudna” Hold?

Reflections on the Future of Israeli Deterrence

AJC Weekly Briefing on Israeli and Middle Eastern Affairs

August 6, 2003

Dr. Eran Lerman

Director Israel/Middle East Office

American Jewish Committee

What is the opposite of war? Ultimately, it is peace, a relationship between states and peoples in which it does not even occur to anyone that war is an option; for example, Canada and the Netherlands each (nowadays) live with no fear of invasion by their much more powerful neighbors, whether they like them or not. But in many transitional stages in history, the answer has been—and remains, in our case—not the prophetic ideal of peace (lions lying down with lambs) but the more brutal, worldly concept of deterrence: lambs with sharp fangs, if you will.

This week, fifty-eight years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, provides an occasion to reflect upon the nature of deterrence and upon the immediate question facing Israel and the Palestinians over the next few weeks and months: Will the “ceasefire,” or hudna—an Arabic and Islamic term carrying the connotation of a temporary convenience, not a change of heart—hold under the pressure of present tensions? Will it be extended beyond its original three months? At the end of the day, while caution and prudent action are necessary, the answer should probably be yes; we will not go back to where we were. But the reason is not that the Palestinians have come to think that the Zionist movement has turned out to be a good idea after all. If the present lull in the killings continues, it will be the effect of successful deterrence (quite possibly, mutual deterrence).

For deterrence to work, it is never enough to compare the brute strength and respective ability of each side to inflict unbearable pain on the other. Yes, the very existence of a deterrent effect depends, in our case, on the capacity and willingness of the IDF to strike back and strike hard. (This perceived need is one of the least understood aspects of Israeli policy when viewed from the outside; but it is absolutely vital to our survival, when viewed from the inside.) Still, for the message to work, it must be “embedded” in the local, regional, and international environment.

This has had some effect already in Lebanon, where Hizballah regularly fires anti-aircraft guns aimed at Israeli towns and villages in the Galilee—but has not gone beyond this limited form of warfare, despite the vast arsenal of Katyusha rockets and even longer range missiles it has amassed with Iranian help (and Syrian support). This restraint, by an organization whose position on Israel and the Jews is clearly exterminatory, is a direct result of forceful Israeli messages about possible retaliation—messages that have found resonance on three levels: The great majority of Lebanese, who saw their country destroyed by the Palestinian terrorist presence, have no wish to go through that cycle again; the Syrians have been told by other Arab states that if they provoke another war, as in 1967, they will be alone; and a firm U.S. message was hand-delivered by Secretary of State Colin Powell.

In the Palestinian context, there is a similar pattern, which may persuade even vicious groups like Hamas that it is better to live and fight another day. The IDF is loudly grumbling that it is getting ready for a breakdown of the hudna—and by implication, that the Israeli response will be extensive and swift. Israel will not wait for the bodies of citizens to pile up and will not exempt Hamas “political” leaders from facing the consequences of their actions. This message is getting through all around, as the following indications demonstrate:

·        In the region, Egypt, which has a great degree of influence on the balance of power, mainly in Gaza, is now working to extend the hudna, not least because a resumption of violence would threaten regional and even internal stability.

·        The United States, and even the UN and some Europeans, have sent clear warnings to the Palestinians as to the consequences of the present “soft” line on terror.

            Arafat read the handwriting on the wall and put together a short-lived farce of “arrests” in his Ramallah compound (muqat’ah). “The world has changed,” he told Kamal Ghanem, a Fatah (Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades) activist wanted by Israel for planning a failed dual suicide attack recently. The terrorists, Arafat went on, should therefore be transferred to a jail in Jericho or Gaza. Working with Iranian backing, like other Fatah radicals, Ghanem found shelter in the muqat’ah while breaking the hudna—typifying the strange, dual nature of the present Palestinian reality; he responded to Arafat with a dose of threats of his own. Ultimately, Arafat “relented” and the would-be killers stayed on as his guests.