We Are In It Together

 

AJC Weekly Briefing on Israeli and Middle Eastern Affairs

Dr. Eran Lerman

Director AJC Israel/Middle East Office

                                             August 31, 2003

 

Men, women, and children in Israel, India, and Iraq; Jews in Jerusalem, Hindus in Mumbai, Iraqi Shi'i worshippers in Najaf; American and British soldiers, UN high-ranking officials and field workers; and for that matter, the many decent Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims who wish as much as we do to find a practical way to live together: we are all, in a sense, victims (and targets) of the same grand delusion, a political fantasy carried over from the previous century.

 

As Paul Berman explains in his excellent (but not easily approachable) book, Terror and Liberalism, this deadly mix of totalitarian thought and the cult of death is by no means unique or endemic to Arabs or Muslims. It is deeply rooted in the ills and convulsions of modern European society. Mercifully, in most of Europe, "practical" politics have taken over. Yet, tragically, the tradition did not die: it migrated. At this point in history, it is among Middle Eastern peoples  that it finds the strongest hold on the hearts and minds of many (and even among Israeli Jews, a few have been swept by the same fascination: a group of radical national-religious terrorists has been arrested this week).

 

The case can be stated in simple terms. When certain sorts of "identity politics" (national, religious, ideological, and various permutations thereof) take over, the most important business at hand becomes the struggle to define oneself through destroying "the Other" (and the Jews are often the ultimate "other"), even at the cost of death. This mindset overpowers everything else: distributive politics (with their daily compromises), economic and social life, creative and constructive work, and the simple dignities of living a decent life. "Blood merchants" such as Saddam Hussein, or Yasir Arafat (in his case, this is a Palestinian expression, not mine) or Usama bin Laden move in to exploit and feed these urges, and it is through the modern media – from the transistor-radio in the 1950's and 1960's, to satellite and internet communications today – that they establish their political hold.

 

There are moments of despair, as the bodies are counted – 20 in Jerusalem; 20 in Baghdad, plus a daily bloodletting among coalition troops; 40 and more in Mumbai; and now some 120 in Najaf – and it seems as if the murderers are predetermined to gain the upper hand. As was once said of the Nazi Luftwaffe, "the bomber will always get through."

 

And yet bombers, wing-born, car-born, or walking on their own two feet, are weapons of war, and wars can be won if one is willing to fight them. Those who wage this war have their calculations and purposes. They can be, and should be, destroyed, but sometimes they can be deterred. In either case, a tenacious, unyielding strategy of prevention, and of exacting a terrible price in response to attacks, is necessary for those who wish to survive and prevail.

 

Viewed from this angle (and from the point of view of Israelis going about  their normal daily business, including the unusually orderly start of a new school year for our children), the recent painful blows do not necessarily indicate that all is lost. Perhaps even the opposite is true, and we should read carefully between the blood-drenched lines to see what lies behind the sudden eruption of violence:

 

1.     To some extent, the decision by certain Hamas elements (the Damascus-based "military" wing, more than the Gaza bosses) to break the so-called "hudna" may have been driven by the fear that they were "losing it": the signs of satisfaction among many Palestinians, who saw "the light at the end of the tunnel," are precisely the reason why some terrorists felt they could no longer wait. Under the terms of the Road Map, they were facing an overt strategy designed to take them out of business (if very slowly and haltingly, in so far as P.A. Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas's tactics remained hesitant). Thus, for them, perpetuating the destructive "cycle of violence" became almost an existential requirement.

 

2.     In this context, the all-too-obvious split between Arafat and Abbas ("Abu Mazen") acquires an interesting significance. Masters do not need to fight their puppets. When Arafat, on a number of issues, chose to prevent "his" Prime Minister from implementing reform (and unification) of the Palestinian Authority, it became obvious to many, here and in the Arab world, that their division on policy is real enough, i.e., that Abu Mazen is really trying to change course (freezing the Hamas "charities" was a major step forward). Even after all that has happened, the sense in the upper reaches of the Israeli defense establishment is that he still should be given a chance; and contrary to the simplistic analysis you might read and hear, the IDF's constant and violent pressure on the Hamas infrastructure in the Gaza Strip is designed to make it easier for him and for Palestinian Authority Security Chief Mohammed Dahlan to act (and thus "prevent an even greater Israeli aggression"; this is their way of saying that deterrence sometimes works).

 

3.     In a sense, even Hamas paid us a strange kind of compliment by launching "Qassam" rockets towards Ashkelon, a relatively large residential town south of Tel Aviv. In almost any country under similar circumstances – and with an artillery corps the size of Israel's – such "statistical fire" against its heartland would have been met by a fierce counter-barrage from howitzer batteries, and much of the Gaza Strip would have been reduced to rubble. But they know, by now, we do not do such things (incursions into Gaza are based on highly specific intelligence). Thus, their choice of weapons reflects the manner in which they have come to assume, and depend upon, our moral restraint.

 

4.     Finally, in the bigger picture, even the hideous massacre in Iraq might prove to be a turning point: not towards the disintegration of the U.S.-led coalition, but rather towards the emergence of an Iraqi "face," a public entity willing to assume some general responsibilities, if only because the present situation has become untenable.

 

          The future of the region hangs upon the need, and prospect, of working with such alternative "faces" in so far as they are willing to do what must be done. True, almost none of them are pure and blameless, even if Palestinian Finance Minister Salam Fayyad does come across as a genuine regional oddity, truly sui generis, a straightforward, honest and practical reformer. The late and now sainted Ayatollah Bakr al-Hakim in Najaf was an ally of the foul regime in Tehran; Ahmed Chalabi and Adnan Pachachi, the secular contenders in Iraq, have their own faults; so do Abu Mazen and Dahlan in the Palestinian arena. But then, we already know that being active in history requires wading in morally murky waters – as long as we do not forget that the crocodiles infesting them are real and deadly.  With this in mind, we should avoid the two pitfalls that have plagued policy in the immediate post-war era:

·        The mission for the local pragmatists should be defined in no uncertain terms. Too many people have already died because Dahlan and Abu Mazen thought they could get away with fulfilling only a fragment of their original Road Map requirement. The mission for the local forces in Iraq should be equally clear – detect, deter, and then destroy the networks of the old regime.

 

·        Nothing, not even a poor choice of leadership, is worse then being caught in the coils of Iraqi, or Palestinian, personal political divisions. Consequently, accepting inaction as a "natural" result. To some extent, indecision in Washington (and, at times, in Israel), over certain "favorites" and their quest for power, accounts for some of the difficulties and delays. Success will require unity of mind and purpose, and the ability to compellingly project that unity to the outside world.