High-Stakes Poker in Jerusalem, Ramallah, and Gaza: Gambles and Choices  

A Weekly Briefing on Israeli and Middle Eastern Affairs

Dramatic events came in quick succession this Shabbat: first, Mahmoud Abbas’s resignation (by now accepted by Arafat, with the speaker of the Palestinian Parliament, Ahmed Qureia, better known as Abu-`Alaa, as the chosen successor); then the failed Israel Air Force bombing raid on the Hamas leadership in Gaza, which might have resulted in the death of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin (but did not); and amidst all this, a major breakthrough in the European alignment against Palestinian terrorism.

And then, an eerie silence settled upon us. A major Hamas “revenge” is still quite possible (and was very much in the cards even before the raid in Gaza). But so far, they have not launched even a Qassam rocket over the border, which they could do with ease whenever they choose. Casting an ear for bad news, which might yet come, Israelis nevertheless went about their business—and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon went to India. Again, the press was rife with speculation about the Sharon family finances. A new cycle of fierce debate about the budget is about to erupt—with military pay and pensions as the traditional focal point, war or no war. Social tensions—among them, the issue of deporting illegal foreign workers—are still with us. Much of our energy this past weekend was spent sulking about our humiliating soccer loss to Slovenia (which took us out of the European Cup) and our exhilarating basketball triumphs over Latvia and—again—Slovenia, which took Israel to the European Quarter Finals. Things may look apocalyptic on CNN and on the front page of the New York Times, but they do not seem so from here.

Why? It would seem, at first glance, that in the latest round at the Palestinian poker table, the hope for a better future lost out:

·        The Israeli Air Force, guided by political factors, chose to gamble on a small bomb (250 kg) for a decapitation strike against the entire Hamas leadership, including Sheikh Yassin himself—sometimes referred to as the “spiritual leader” of Hamas, but his physical disability notwithstanding, he is about as “spiritual” as Usama bin Laden—which had been meeting for a war council in an apartment house in Gaza. This was clearly based, as the current Pentagon parlance goes, on the best “actionable intelligence” money can buy (money meaning investment in technical capabilities—and money, in bundles, to human sources). The gamble failed: Here, as in two recent West Bank battles in which soldiers died, going where firepower could have gone without them,  Israel paid a price for the moral qualms that arose from a previous (successful) strike in Gaza that took too high a toll in innocent lives.

·        Abbas (Abu Mazen), too, had gambled—on the willingness and ability of Israel, the United States, and the international community to keep him in power. He relied on this support and bitterly complained when it began to wane, even though he deliberately chose to move at a very slow pace toward the goals outlined in the road map. He ended up missing the bus (an ugly phrase, in this context); had he done two months ago what he did in his last week in office—when he and his men finally closed down the Hamas “charity” channels, threatened (at long last) to disarm them rather than just politely asking them to stop, and began to take actions against incitement to “martyrdom”—many lives would have been saved, and with them, his position as prime minister. As it was, by the time he acted, the world was powerless to save him from the counteractions of Arafat and his greedy friends, who resented—far more than they disagreed on policy considerations—Abu Mazen’s attempt to reform the Palestinian Authority and impose a degree of accountability. As for the Europeans, their quick endorsement of Abu `Alaa raises suspicion that some in Brussels always saw him as “their” man, in contrast to the American endorsement of Abu Mazen.

·        On the other hand, Arafat gambled—successfully—on getting away with it one more time, based on the ongoing dialogue he still maintains with many in the Arab world and in the international arena, and on his exploit of Fatah thugs from within. (It was their brutal attacks, with Arafat’s blessing, that finally drove Abu Mazen to resign.) Arafat still sits in Ramallah, for the moment, happy with himself.

·        As for Hamas, their leadership survived—and apparently succeeded in destroying the Abu Mazen government, and with it, the road map and the Aqaba spirit, as they had wanted to do all along. As in 1996, their actions are cheered on by Iran and other radicals, who fear that any progress toward a compromise agreement in the Middle East would threaten their very raison d’etre.

            A closer look, however, reveals a very different picture, as the players prepare to play their cards yet again:

·        Hamas leaders have little to show for their strategy. The process may have stalled, but did not die. Their prestige among many Palestinians, who fear that their chances for a better life are again under threat, is slowly declining. In the Arab world, their isolation is now obvious: The Egyptians were furious that the “hudna” was broken, and the king of Morocco felt safe enough to host Israeli Foreign Minister Sylvan Shalom, even while air raids on Gaza targets were going on. Finally, in Europe the decision to place the Hamas “political” wing on the list of terrorist organizations similarly sent a strong signal that, if they persist in violence, they will face the consequences alone.

·        Arafat may look like the winner, but he knows by now that his only way of preserving his authority is to be (or more precisely, to allow Abu `Alaa to become) “more Abu Mazen than Abu Mazen.” Any attempt to reverse course on reform, on Hamas finances, on incitement –indeed, any major terror attack—could swiftly break down the last barriers to his expulsion.

·        As for Abu `Alaa himself and his new security boss, General Nasser Yusuf al-Bashtawi, there are reasons to give them, at first, the benefit of the doubt. They are less tainted by terror or by “Holocaust minimization” than were their predecessors; pragmatic, and less given to whining (Abbas) or boasting (Dahlan); and, more important still, Qureia had indicated, back in 2002, his willingness to work for an interim agreement—a state with “provisional borders,” as envisioned in Stage II of the road map—whereas Abu Mazen had begun to try to cut through to Stage III, where failure was almost certain.

·        Finally, Israel is not nearly as cornered, or clueless, as critics from the right and left imply. Moreover, the remarkable resilience of Israeli society, indicated in recent polls showing growing optimism about the future, can be seen in things great and small. Just recently, our Project Interchange guests, a group of Florida law enforcement officers, told us how amazed they were to see thousands of Israelis crowding into the Hutzot Ha-Yotzer arts and crafts fair in Jerusalem. This resilience has become, in itself, a strategic factor, giving Prime Minister Sharon the room he needs to maneuver (and the time to go to India) while the next round of complications unfolds.