The Hobbits of Brussels
and the Future of European Policy in the Middle East:
A Joint Special Briefing from Jerusalem and Berlin
January 2, 2003
By Deidre Berger and Eran Lerman
Directors, Berlin and Israel Offices of AJC, Respectively
A journalistic convention of the 1970s, which made its way into the popular novels of Paul Erdman and others, spoke of the “gnomes of Zurich,” hoarding their gold in the depths of the earth. It was only later that the truth behind the image came into focus. Now, as storm clouds gather over the Iraqi horizon and U.S.-European rifts on key issues, particularly on policy toward the Middle East, are as visible as they have ever been, it is useful to turn to J.R.R. Tolkien’s trilogy—the books, not the films—for an appropriate analogy.
This is what he had to say, in the prologue to The Lord of the Rings, of the Hobbits, ensconced in their shire (the “North-West of the Old World, east of the Sea”):
…and there in that pleasant corner of the world they plied their well-ordered business of living, and they heeded less and less the world outside where dark things moved, until they came to think that peace and plenty were the rule in Middle-earth and the right of all sensible folk. They forgot or ignored what little they had ever known of the Guardians, and of the labours of those that made possible the long peace of the Shire. They were, in fact, sheltered, but they had ceased to remember it. [Emphasis added.]
Sensible folk indeed, the Hobbits of Brussels—and of much of the rest of happy, prosperous Europe—who have every right to feel proud of the rise of their continent from the ruins of 1945 to unity, stability, and levels of human achievement (economic, social and cultural) unequaled in history. Americans (and Israelis) have no business deriding these achievements. It is, however, our business—very much so—to worry about whether growing disparities in the assessment about the nature of the global threats has become a problem affecting our own future.
Insofar as the need for shelter against “dark things” is involved, the European powers have essentially failed to act on their own. Again and again, from Haiti to Kuwait to Somalia to Afghanistan (with the exception of a few short-term interventions, mostly French and occasionally British, in sub-Saharan Africa), it has fallen to American forces to enforce some semblance of order in the wreckage of the post-Cold War Third World.
Even more ominous were the European responses to the challenge of Yugoslavia’s disintegration (a process that to some extent was hastened by the disunity among Europe’s leaders in facing the gathering storm clouds): Srebrenica stands, in retrospect, as the emblem of this failure to halt the rampage of a very “dark thing” indeed. Once more, it ultimately fell to American military power to do just that. Since then, however, Europeans have played an important role in maintaining a fragile but continuing peace in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia.
To some extent, this is now the key problem at the core of U.S.- European differences on both the Iraqi question and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: At what point must one delay or subordinate the efforts to solve long-term problems that give rise to conflict (in itself, a time-honored, and perfectly legitimate, European pursuit), and instead focus on the immediate task of defeating—yes, by brute force—the totalitarian terror-masters (and those who choose them as their allies) on the field of battle? The very business of war, the possibility that it might at times be inevitable, has become alien. For two generations, Western Europeans have been sheltered against a very specific form of evil—not surprisingly, the issues are much more readily explained to East Europeans, like the Czechs, for whom tyranny is not a remote abstraction—and have lost the inclination to fight the (very real) enemies we all face in the void created by the Soviet collapse.
The manifestations as far as the Middle East is concerned are numerous, and often troubling:
· The U.S.-German quarrel over Iraq, an echo of similar sentiments voiced by many back in 1991. The German refusal to consider participation in a military campaign in Iraq reflects, as do similar attitudes across Europe, not only a deep-seated suspicion of U.S. motives, but an equally powerful (and in the German historical context, perhaps laudable) reluctance to face up to the need to use force.
· All European allies of the United States officially supported the decision to go to war in Afghanistan, and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder even risked the collapse of his governing coalition to win approval for German solidarity in this first phase of the war against terrorism. Nevertheless, until the liberation of Kabul and the images of joyful women casting off their burkas, derision of the “cowboy in the White House” and protests against “the American war against the people of Afghanistan” were widespread across the European continent, where even today many continue to be skeptical about the benefits brought to Afghanistan by the U.S.-led war effort there.
· The almost reflexive reaction, across Europe, to Israeli counterterrorist activities, often described in emotive terms, such as “revenge,” “tit-for-tat,” “extrajudicial killings,” “cycle of violence,” etc. This practice of reducing the conflict to a caricature of the Israeli Goliath in tanks versus the Palestinian David with stones precludes an understanding of what this really is: a war, messy as they often are, fought against an organized and vicious enemy for whom terrorism has become a weapon of choice.
· A somewhat delicate question arose over the Syrian president’s visit to London, necessary as it may have been in the run-up to the war against Saddam. Clearly, this was an act of statesmanship, deemed necessary by the United States, and designed to persuade the Syrians to avoid escalation on Israel’s northern border. Nevertheless, some of the symbolic aspects of the visit do raise questions as to the moral threshold of European tolerance toward state sponsors of terrorism.
· Much the same could be said about ongoing negotiations between Iran and the EU for a free-trade agreement. This initiative follows upon the “critical dialogue” that lasted throughout the 1990s, despite the open commitment of the Iranian revolution to the destruction of Israel, with Hizballah as the key instrument in this strategy, and despite the deadly nature of Khamenei’s support for terrorist activities designed to derail the peace process. Thanks largely to German persistence, a political dialogue on issues of concern to the U.S. and the EU (and Israel), including Iran’s weapons programs and support for terrorism, is to accompany the trade negotiations. It remains to be seen how far the Europeans will go in making economic ties subject to their political demands, but given the track record, there is little ground for optimism.
· The meeting of French leaders, as well as the prime minister of Canada, with Hizballah leader Hasan Nasrallah during the summit meeting of worldwide Francophone countries, held for the first time in Beirut, was in line with this ambiguous attitude toward Iranian-sponsored terrorism.
· The recent UN Security Council vote to condemn the attacks in Mombassa—in itself, a welcome break with past patterns of silence—only serves to remind us that such specific condemnation of Arab terrorism has rarely won European support in the UN Security Council throughout these two years of war, and never, until now, without being “counterbalanced” by a condemnation of Israeli actions (which is not to say that strong European voices were not heard elsewhere, most notably, from German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, in the wake of the Dolphinarium bombing in Tel Aviv, which he witnessed).
Put together with the recurrent problems of anti-Semitic incidents in parts of Europe; with the new spate of lawsuits against individual Israelis, abusing the notion of universal jurisdiction so as to further isolate Israeli leaders as pariahs in the international community, and to deny Israel the right of self-defense; with the attempts to boycott Israeli academics and Israeli products; with the spreading tendency in the European media to compare Israel to the Nazi regime, while willfully ignoring the genocidal propaganda on the other side, all this would be enough, one might feel, to lead us to despair about the entire relationship.
Yet we cannot, nor should we, jump overboard just because the current passage makes us queasy. The Jewish population of the world was once predominantly (Central and Eastern) European. Due to the flight of European Jews, first from Czarist persecution and then from the Nazis, and the near extermination of those who did not leave in time, the two wings of the Jewish people will be, for the foreseeable future, Israeli and American Jews. And yet history lingers with us, giving intensity and depth to the ongoing exchange with Europeans about our rights, our identity, and our place in the world, as well as to the awakening of the remnants of Jewish life in Central and Eastern Europe. Beyond that lie practical reasons: As the largest bloc of democratic states ever unified into a single political union, with the Euro consolidating the EU’s status as an economic superpower, with two permanent seats in the UN Security Council, with the “soft power” of ideas, Europe cannot be ignored. On the contrary, to ensure the security and economic well-being of Israel, Europe must be seen as a political and strategic partner, not only of the United States, but of Israel as well.
Indeed, the best hope for Israel lies in “a new Mediterranean,” in which the increasingly prosperous powers of the European southern tier will play an active role, as will Israeli high-tech, biotechnology, and other cutting-edge economic assets.
If we avert our gaze for a moment from the messy realities of the current situation (while we keep hammering at them to put them right), we might notice certain dynamics that could evolve, in the not-so-distant future, in positive directions:
1. The eastward enlargement of the EU (and of NATO) is bringing into Europe new peoples with less “Hobbit-like” habits—most of whom have struck up, sometimes because of the legacy of the past, strong and special relationships with Israel. As many partners of AJC’s Berlin office have already noted, Germany will no longer be alone in defending Israel within the EU. The potential admission of Turkey to the EU would reinforce this trend.
2. This enlargement of the EU from fifteen to twenty-five member states, and the pending decision on Turkey, places Europe at a critical historical crossroads. Since World War I, AJC has played a role in putting issues of minority rights on the agenda in these regions, and continues to do so now. Will history and religion of the constituent nations of the EU or the political principles of democracy, pluralism, and the rule of law determine European identity in the twenty-first century? This question is critical to the future of Europe and its relationships with Israel and the U.S.
3. The growing sensitivity of Europeans to the issue of immigration is bound to lead to an enhancement of the Barcelona process—a forum for discussion on the joint economic future of Europe and the Middle East, with Israel participating alongside many Arab partners—and to more focused attempts to fix the basic problems outlined in the UN report on Arab Human Development. The success of right-wing parties across the continent in 2002 testified to the need to integrate more aggressively the fifteen million Muslim immigrants already living within the EU and the corresponding public desire to limit further immigration. Ultimately, European policymakers will recognize, as Washington finally has, that making sounds about the Palestinian situation is not enough to solve the multiple crises within the Arab world that directly affect the future of Europe. The flow of immigrants from the southern coast of the Mediterranean in search of a better life will only abate once the misery plaguing their home countries begins to abate. In the long run, this Mediterranean integration is very much in Europe’s and in Israel's interest.
4. When it comes to economic ties, Israel needs Europe, and vice versa. As the Israeli national security adviser, Ephraim Halevi, who formerly headed the Mossad and then served as ambassador to the EU and NATO in Brussels, recently told the Israel-America Chamber of Commerce, the United States regularly complains about Israeli import patterns. For reasons of habit and sentiment, as well as practicality and proximity, Israel buys in Europe almost twice as much as she sells, and much more than she buys in America. A quick look at the cars on any Israeli road tells the story (although Japan and Korea, after dropping their boycott, have made great inroads as well). Moreover, it is now safe to state that after two years and more, the bark of Israel’s detractors in Europe is worse than their bite. In the future, it will be Israel, not Saudi Arabia or the rich Gulf states, with whom Europe will have the most extensive economic interaction, and Israel already is the greatest and best market for European products in the Middle East. The policy underneath the rhetoric, even on such delicate issues as imports from the territories, reflects the importance of this market to European industry.
5. Finally, the European view of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in general, and the role of Arafat in particular, is beginning to change, albeit very slowly. Earlier this year, an article in a German weekly entitled “Arafat Bombs, Europe Pays,” startled a German public that was unused to such critical reports about the machinations of the Palestinian Authority. For all our fears about the role that the Europeans (let alone the UN Secretary General and the Russians) might play in the Quartet, there is also a reverse learning curve at play. As they go deeper into the details of implementing the “road map," the Europeans are learning more and more about both the pernicious role played by Arafat in the present conflict and the need to deal with the basic problems in Palestinian and Arab education and culture before any progress can be achieved.
Already in April, at a conference cosponsored by AJC in Berlin, it was German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer who gave much higher marks to Sharon than to Arafat for cooperation—to the surprise of many of his listeners. Such sentiments have become even more pronounced since then, most recently expressed by Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi during Israeli President Moshe Katsav’s visit. The very notion of Europeans signing on to the demand for Arafat’s removal was “science fiction” a year ago. Now it is fact. There is hope yet that the Europeans will move beyond the overly simplified David-and-Goliath metaphor to gain a greater awareness of the complications and moral difficulties facing any democracy battling terrorism. This would be a necessary evolution toward taking a more active role in paving the way for negotiations for a just and lasting peace.