The Israeli Public Weighs the Options:
Ayalon-Nusseibeh, Geneva, the Road Map -- and the Fence
November 13, 2003

Dr. Eran Lerman
Director Israel/Middle East Office
The American Jewish Committee

In recent weeks, a strange situation has arisen with regard to the options being presented to the Israel public. The government of Ariel Sharon—quite deliberately—is reluctant to explain in much detail the nature of the high-stakes diplomatic and military game it is playing, a game aimed at the painful partition of Eretz Israel (the land of Israel) west of the River Jordan—but, nevertheless, a more favorable partition than the one offered at Camp David, let alone later in Taba. To this end, the option of negotiations with the Palestinians, on one hand, and the creation of facts on the ground (i.e., the fence), on the other, need to be delicately and effectively balanced against each other—a trick not easily turned under the limelight of PR exposure. Hence the silence, particularly when it comes to presentation of a coherent plan to the public.

The Israeli prime minister himself addresses mostly foreign guests and usually confines himself to general principles (including a strong, recurrent peroration on the issue of Jerusalem; he claims, with some justification, that his views are in line with the positions that were equally dear to the heart of the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, assassinated eight years ago). Beyond broad hints about his willingness to pay—elsewhere—a high price for peace, Sharon offers no specifics; clearly, "the vision thing" is not his natural domain—or rather, such visions as he does have would not be well served, he thinks, by an early exposure to the firestorms of recrimination and abuse that pass in Israel for political debate.

However, in keeping with the old myth about horror vacui -- dread of an empty space—this intellectual void was soon filled with other propositions. The cautious silence at the higher levels of government prompted considerable anguish among our ancient people (and even more so, among our secular political elites), trained to orient themselves toward a brighter day in the not-too-distant future. Into this breach stepped various nongovernmental groups with initiatives, offering hope for the future and specific actions for the present:

• First, at least in terms of the public arena, came the National Census Project (Ha-mifkad Ha-leumi), offered by the former head of the General Security Services (GSS or Shabak), Rear Admiral Ami Ayalon, and a prominent Palestinian scholar and president of Al-Quds University in Jerusalem, Sari Nusseibeh. Their plan defines a number of key principles—a clear-cut renunciation of the so-called "Right of Return" and an Israeli commitment to withdraw (more or less) to the June 4, 1967, lines—and seeks to win support for them through the signatures of many thousands of Israelis and Palestinians. (So far, 100,000 Israelis and some 60,000 Palestinians have signed—well short of the "million each" the organizers hoped to see.)
• Meanwhile, a well-funded effort is now on, aimed at promoting the so-called (as yet unsigned) Geneva document by putting a copy of the draft into every Israeli mailbox. This is necessary, the signatories believe, because a careful reading of the detailed agreements and of the maps outlined would convince many Israelis that this was a worthwhile effort. Click here to read the document.

This need, as the initiators see it, to change the public climate, reflects what the Geneva signatories were obliged to recognize last week, when a highly respected poll, conducted by the Steinmetz Center for the Study of Peace in Tel Aviv University (which cannot be suspected of harboring manipulative anti-Geneva sentiments) was published in Ha'aretz. A distinct majority, nearly three out of four Israelis, turned out to be in disagreement with the Geneva accords (or what they had heard about them).

It should be clear: Initiatives such as Ayalon-Nusseibeh and even, in the eyes of many, the much more detailed effort that led to the "Geneva" deal, are not generally or widely perceived as "treason"—in fact, those (like National Religious Party MK Shaul Yahalom) who used such language in public ended up being reprimanded. This is not, in other words, an irrational or benighted response to Arab violence. In fact, an equally or even more robust majority among the same sample turned out to be acutely aware of the need for Israel to separate from the Palestinians. They simply did not think, however, that the only way to do so was to comply with Yasir Arafat's demands.

There is one aspect of the political "alternatives" common to all of them, which causes many Israelis to regard them with some caution—even if they regard them as legitimate aspects of the political debate. They all offer Arafat and the Palestinians more, or much more, than they could have achieved at Camp David — a consideration that should have given the signatories some pause. For the present IDF command, in any case, this is one of the main reasons why they resist draft agreements that could be perceived as rewarding terrorism.

The Geneva draft, moreover, raises further questions that are unlikely to be dispelled even by a careful reading:

• The extent of concessions in Jerusalem—including the control of the Temple Mount and a Palestinian flag at the Jaffa Gate of the Old City, a highly controversial proposition that could lead to violent divisions within Israeli society;
• The involvement of foreign powers, some of them quite unpopular, in the implementation and verification process;
• The overt party-political nature of the exercise, aimed (as Ayalon said sharply, bitter about being upstaged) to bring down the government, or, the cynics say, to block the return of Ehud Barak to the Labor Party leadership.

Moreover, the poll reveals an Israeli electorate that is neither leftist (Geneva) nor right-wing (no to any partition); it has gone through a painful "de-messianization" of politics and does not expect instant solutions. If the Road Map continues to look as if it is stuck (here we may be positively surprised by Ahmed Qureia, but only if the U.S. regains momentum in Iraq), they will continue to do what six out of seven Israelis have been doing for several months already: casting their hopes with the fence being built as quickly and as effectively as possible. If Sharon can leverage this overwhelming support, as he negotiates a stable interim agreement, so much the better.