The American Jewish Committee

 

What the Coming Conflict Is All About:

Now the Arab Regimes Are Urging Saddam to Leave Power

 Weekly Briefing on Israeli and Middle Eastern Affairs

January 22, 2003

 

Dr. Eran Lerman, Director Israel/Middle East Office

  

A subtle change—perhaps not quite so subtle—has been noticed in Arab (as well as Turkish and Iranian) attitudes toward “the War on Iraq,” which probably should be called the “War of Iraqi Liberation.” The regional players, with few exceptions, are still quite keen on preventing a war, if possible, but they have come to see (while governments and demonstrators in Europe have not) that it cannot be prevented as long as Saddam Hussein hangs on to power.

 

Hence the various initiatives, summits (in Damascus and then Ankara), open calls for Saddam to resign, and envoys carrying the message to Baghdad. This way, Middle Eastern leaders can at least make the case to their own restive “street”: “Look, we gave Saddam a good chance to avert war by abdicating, but he was obstinate.” Moreover, in the highly unlikely case of success, Saddam’s abdication would keep real power in Iraq in the hands of a designated elite, rather than opening the floodgates for a U.S.-induced experiment in democratization—a prospect dreaded by most Arab regimes. (Interestingly, the Turkish plan is said to be different: Saddam would stay in power as a powerless figurehead, while a politically pluralistic system is built in Baghdad and the opposition shares power.)

 

If any of this could happen, it would indeed be an ideal solution: Without bloodshed, this would achieve the desired effect of removing Saddam or trivializing him as a historic figure, finally breaking almost two generations of Arab power fantasies, which again and again have ended in tragedy. After all, this war (and our war on Palestinian terrorism) is not simply against a certain set of weapons—chemical and biological agents, or suicide bombers, for that matter—but also against the cruel fantasies that drive these weapons: conquest and domination in the name of Arab unity (or in the name of the Islamic revolution), and/or the destruction of the State of Israel. Real change in the Middle East can come only when such fantasies are replaced by constructive and cooperative visions for the future.

 

It is this basic realization, not just arguments about the inspectors’ mission, that colors the U.S. position so differently from that of the allies. European instincts run to keeping things as they are (even if this leads to obviously crazy situations, such the election of Libya—!—to chair the UN Commission on Human Rights, a body that  AJC helped create back in 1945). So did American instincts in the Middle East, for much too long—but no longer.

 

The terrorists know what is at stake. It is not without reason that Hizballah suddenly ignited the Har Dov (also known as Sheba’a Farms) sector, northwest of Mount Hermon yesterday; and that a major attack was launched (but foiled) from the Jenin area, in an attempt to bring a large car-bomb into Israel. They seem to realize that with great changes at the gates, time may be running out for them, as well as for Saddam (and Arafat?). The very willingness of Hamas to participate in the Cairo talks—after playing hard-to-get for a while—indicates the growing need to insure themselves against “the day after,” even as they work to carry out further attacks.

 

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Can Israeli democracy use the new opportunities that will be created to move toward what Churchill once called the “broad, sunlit uplands” of a better future in the region?

 

 The current picture can be distressing at times: The system barely functions, the Knesset might end up as fractured as ever, and Sharon, still universally assumed to be our next prime minister, might find it exceedingly difficult to put together a functioning government. In the grip of the far right, he will find it very difficult to move. Sadly, many on the Israeli left seem to prefer the scenario in which they stay out of power, the right crashes badly, and they can take the wheel again (if the engine is still running).          

 

And yet, as a strange piece of polling revealed this week, many Israelis prefer a unifying player (as Shimon Peres has been over the last two years) over Mitzna’s decisive—and divisive—posture. To what extent this will be translated into workable political alliances “on January 29,” the day after the elections, will depend not only on internal Israeli dynamics. A U.S.-led campaign to bring change to the Middle East would also have a powerful impact, working in favor of those, like Sharon, who have labored in recent years to maintain the special relationship.