Letter from a Diplomatic Marathoner

by

David A. Harris

Executive Director, American Jewish Committee

October 13, 2003

            I’ve always wanted to run the New York Marathon, but the stamina just isn’t there. A 10K race is about as far as I’ve ever been able to go, and I won’t even mention my time or placement. Suffice it to say that my only goal has been to finish the race in one piece. And, believe me, that doesn’t get easier with the passage of time.

            The next best thing in New York is the annual Diplomatic Marathon, arguably no less taxing than the road runners’ race, even if it’s confined to less than a square mile on Manhattan’s East Side. Actually, there’s no such thing as the Diplomatic Marathon, but it’s what we at the American Jewish Committee have dubbed the two-week period each fall that follows the opening of the UN General Assembly and is conducted under the auspices of our Madeline and Bruce M. Ramer Institute for Diplomatic Relations. World leaders descend on New York to deliver speeches before the world body and to meet with one another.

            A decade ago, following the creation of a pioneering AJC Ambassadors’ Forum in Washington, which brought envoys of key countries together with Jewish audiences on a monthly basis, we decided to approach the presidents, prime ministers, and foreign ministers who flood New York in September for meetings. In the first year, we managed to schedule four meetings. Ten years later, the number has risen to over sixty-five, plus a couple we do together with other Jewish agencies.

            Handling four meetings over the span of two weeks is one thing, handling sixty-five quite another. Enter the notion of a marathon. Insofar as there are ten working days in this period, it comes out to an average of more than 6.5 meetings per day. Given the fact that each meeting requires adequate preparation, that they’re often back-to-back, and that getting around the East Side at this time of year can be next to impossible for security reasons, the whole process can be draining, much as it’s also exhilarating.

            Above all, our Diplomatic Marathon is a unique opportunity to engage world leaders on issues of immediate concern. Sure, we have ongoing diplomatic contacts year- round, as a result of travel abroad and links with ambassadors and consuls general posted in this country and at the UN, but the possibilities afforded by New York as a once-a-year world diplomatic stage are simply without equal.

            Our program has grown to the point where a government official commented that, other than the Department of State, no American institution has such extensive contact with foreign leaders at this time of year as the American Jewish Committee.

            What explains our formula for success? There are four basic elements.

            First, the American Jewish Committee is seen as a leading representative of an influential American Jewish community. Foreign leaders believe it’s important to engage the Jewish community in the world’s most powerful country.

            It may be because they believe that American Jews can be encouraged to use their voice and access to shape America’s political attitudes toward a particular country. Perhaps they seek assistance on specific diplomatic or legislative matters. Or maybe they hope American Jews will take an economic interest, leading to expanded trade and investment. Whatever the particular reason, the thinking goes that American Jews should not be ignored. Their good will can be helpful; their ill will can be harmful to a country’s interests. In other words, the bottom line is the perception of American Jewish power, personified in this case by the American Jewish Committee.

            Second, the American Jewish Committee works at diplomacy twelve months a year. Thus, these meetings grow naturally out of ongoing contacts that take place in New York, Washington, other American cities where foreign diplomats are stationed, Geneva, and individual countries, as well as with Jewish communities around the world.

            Indeed, for virtually every country with which we meet during the Diplomatic Marathon, there is an extensive history of previous contacts. And we don’t just maintain contacts with those countries when there are particular issues, e.g., an anti-Semitic outbreak, a restitution issue, or a problematic UN vote. Rather, we stay in touch with as many countries as possible, in large part to be in a better position, with greater credibility, if a particular issue should arise.

            Third, our diplomacy is two-way. Some Jewish organizations, in their approach to other countries, have adopted the attitude that the world owes the Jewish people for crimes of commission and omission during the Shoah. To the extent that this was a prevalent feeling in any country—and there weren’t ever very many in this category—it’s rapidly disappearing. In other words, in this day and age, Holocaust awareness does not form a foundation for long-term diplomacy. Nor does debating the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, as if proving that right has been on Israel’s side since 1948 alone will sway a country to be more sympathetic to Israel’s case today. Would that it were so easy!

            Diplomacy entails understanding the country with which we are engaged and assessing the way it calculates its national interests. Moreover, it means grasping how a Jewish organization can factor itself into that calculation of national interests. Much as we might wish otherwise, simply making good arguments on a given issue, or appealing to moral or ethical considerations, won’t necessarily sway a foreign government. As a veteran of literally a couple of thousand diplomatic encounters over the past two decades, I can attest to this reality.

            The American Jewish Committee has a proactive foreign policy that allows us to engage in two-way diplomacy. No, we don’t fly F-15s, negotiate treaties, or dispense surplus grain, but we do our best to leverage the considerable strengths we bring to the table. For example, consistent with our commitment to the promotion of democratic values, humanitarian assistance, and intergroup understanding and to the protection of human rights, we have undertaken a number of important initiatives. It’s worthwhile to spell out some of them, as they’re a distinguishing feature of AJC.

            We were the first organization of our kind to publicly support the two recent waves of NATO expansion involving a total of ten countries; to call on the Bush (41) administration to recognize the independence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; and to urge the same administration to support Ukraine’s assertion of freedom from Moscow. Similarly, we successfully lobbied for an end to the application of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to Bulgaria and Romania, and have urged similar action for Russia. And we were the first Jewish organization outside Germany to support German unification.

            In the late 1980s, AJC began to devote more attention to the nations of Asia and the Pacific, and we urged Washington and Jerusalem to consider enhanced trade and strategic cooperation with the democracies of that critical region. We followed closely the independence struggle in East Timor, sending a delegate there shortly after the fighting ended and inviting East Timorese delegates to meet with the American Jewish Committee on numerous occasions. We have sought to heighten India’s profile in Washington after decades of benign neglect resulting from the Cold War. We have worked closely with Turkish officials to enhance appreciation of that country’s vital geopolitical role at the intersection of Europe and Asia. We have assisted Azerbaijan to get out from under onerous U.S. trade restrictions.

            We’ve helped Peru on trade matters. We’ve assisted Costa Rican political leaders to get a high-level hearing in Washington. We’ve taken an interest in immigration and trade issues affecting U.S.-Mexican and U.S.-Central American relations.

            We were early supporters of the United Nations. Historians have credited us with a key role in the inclusion of human rights protections in the UN Charter. We were strong advocates for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Genocide Convention. A former AJC president, Jacob Blaustein, originally launched the idea of a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, which three decades later became a reality. On two separate occasions we have provided funds to assist the work of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, first in the Balkans, more recently in Afghanistan.

            Through the generosity of several AJC members, we have been able to undertake a number of other humanitarian initiatives. For example, we have contributed a unit for treating cancer victims in an Israeli-built hospital in Mauritania, an Arab country with full diplomatic links with Israel. We built a school in Turkey after an earthquake devastated the region, and rebuilt a school in India also hit by an earthquake. Collaborating with the German military and a German Protestant non-governmental agency, we provided medical and other relief assistance to Kosovar Muslims fleeing Serbia’s policy of ethnic cleansing. And we have supported relief efforts in famine-ravaged sub-Saharan Africa, as well as in Rwanda after the 1994 genocide. Currently in South Africa, we are funding a local program to combat the impact of AIDS.

            This is only a partial list, but it’s meant to illustrate both the range and diversity of AJC’s unrivaled initiatives in the international arena. All are entirely consistent with our core values as an agency. We would not violate those values in pursuit of short-term political gain. But, given the obvious fact that we cannot be everywhere, these initiatives are also selected with an eye toward maximizing our political objectives, which include strengthening Israel’s standing in the community of nations, combating anti-Semitism, and setting an example for constructive intergroup relations.

            There’s still more. We are able to draw upon the stature, experience, and network of key component parts of the agency. They include the Office of Government and International Affairs, the Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights, the Asia and Pacific Rim Institute, the Israel and Middle East Office, United Nations Watch, the Lawrence and Lee Ramer Center for German-Jewish Relations, the Harriet and Robert Heilbrunn Institute for International Interreligious Understanding, Thanks To Scandinavia, 33 chapter offices, the Departments of Research and Publications, the Division on Middle East and International Terrorism, our new Latino and Latin American Affairs and Russian desks, and Project Interchange, which in the past year has expanded to include seminars taking European influentials to Israel. The American Jewish Committee and two of its affiliates, it should be noted, all have UN accreditation. Further, our ten partnerships with Jewish communities around the world and extensive network of interethnic and interreligious contacts are often extremely helpful in pursuing diplomatic goals.

            And not least, the participants in our diplomacy include former U.S. ambassadors and negotiators, leading experts on international organizations and human rights, veterans of our diplomatic activities who have befriended our interlocutors, and persons with business, cultural, or academic links with particular countries.

            Fourth, a key to our diplomatic formula is that we’re not in this for the headlines. We do this work because it’s vitally important to the Jewish people worldwide. And because the stakes are so high, we don’t play games, violate confidences, run to the media after an off-the-record session, or level wild accusations to embarrass others.

            Our goal is to influence the thinking of governments on matters of significance, and the best way to do that is to build relationships based on trust and confidence and to appeal to their own national interests. To do that, we learn to speak truth to power, but in a way that keeps the door open and the conversation going. The key is not just to have the first meeting, but the second and third ones as well. Governments don’t turn around on a dime, to say the least. I might add that we also gain much valuable information and many insights from these encounters with world leaders.

            We’ve had our share of concrete successes. Let me mention just two.

            An Israeli legal expert was just elected as vice chair of the UN’s Sixth (Legal) Committee for the first time in history. This came about because Israel is now a member of one of the five regional groups (WEOG, or the West European and Others Group) that determine election to such key posts.

            If Israel today is a member, it’s due in no small measure to the American Jewish Committee’s diplomatic efforts, over many years, to focus a spotlight on Israel’s anomalous status as the only UN country not allowed membership in one of the five regional groups. When Israel was finally offered temporary membership in WEOG, Dore Gold, Israel’s former ambassador to the UN, declared that “AJC changed history.”

            And when the 55-member Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) gathered in Vienna in June to spend two days assessing the state of anti-Semitism in member countries, it resulted in part from a persistent AJC campaign in Europe and the United States to garner backing for such a gathering, the first of its kind. The original concept was far from a slam dunk; many countries needed convincing that the subject of anti-Semitism warranted a separate conference. Now we are building support for a second such meeting, which we hope will take place in Berlin next year.

            In the 2003 Diplomatic Marathon, once again we learned a great deal, exchanged views on key matters, measured the international temperature, and pressed certain points. It’s impossible to summarize 65 meetings in a few paragraphs—our Office of Government and International Affairs will, as always, prepare a full report on each—but let me share with you a few of the more interesting moments.

            While much discussion understandably focused on Iraq, including the possibility of a second UN Security Council resolution, there was widespread concern about Iran.

            The Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency has imposed an October 31 deadline on Iran to provide full transparency and full disclosure of its nuclear program. Signals from Tehran are mixed as to whether the government will comply with these demands. While one Arab foreign minister with whom we met predicted that Iran would acquiesce, another confidently asserted that it would not, and foresaw a Western strike against Iran within the next three-to-four years. Interestingly, the Western leader most troubled by developments in Iran appeared to be French President Jacques Chirac. He spoke to us of his anxiety over intermediate-range missiles, with a range of 1,000 miles, displayed at a recent military parade in Tehran, and predicted that the UN Security Council would find agreement in dealing with Iran.

            On Israel, it’s impossible to generalize about our discussions, but one thing can be said: When it comes to bilateral relations, Israel is in pretty good shape. Indeed, some countries, including Macedonia, asked for our help in enhancing ties. But when it comes to regional or global forums, Israel hardly stands a chance.

            Take countries like India, Singapore, and Turkey. The state of bilateral ties between these three countries and Israel is truly excellent. High-level contacts are frequent, trade is growing, and cooperation extends to the military and intelligence spheres. But when it comes to the UN, with few exceptions, these three countries regularly vote against Israel. All say that they seek to moderate the texts of anti-Israel resolutions, but when push comes to shove, they go along with the automatic majority because they fear a price to be paid in the world body if they vote otherwise.

            In a way, the same can be said for the European Union countries. All fifteen have solid relations with Israel, especially now that Israel has returned its ambassadors to Belgium and Austria after political difficulties with each. But in the multilateral sphere, the EU, which defines itself as evenhanded, in fact leans toward the Palestinian side. At best, EU countries might abstain on an anti-Israel resolution, but seldom, if ever, will the EU join with Israel and the United States in opposing such a measure.

            Most troubling for me in this round of diplomatic meetings was the infuriating lack of sympathy for Israel’s extraordinary security difficulties and policy dilemmas. To be sure, some ministers evinced understanding. Noteworthy in this group were the ministers from Australia, several Pacific Island nations, and a number of Central and East European countries, including Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania.

            But, by and large, we heard endless repetitions of such profoundly troubling phrases as “cycle of violence” to describe the situation on the ground. This implies a moral symmetry and an equal assignment of blame for the violence and terror. And while there isn’t much love lost for Arafat, Sharon didn’t fare much better.

            Yet, at the same time, no one seemed to have any answers, either. There were calls for continuation of the peace process, pursuit of the Road Map, commitment to the success of the new Palestinian prime minister, and restraint by Israel, but in a way they rang hollow. The harsh reality is that, absent a Palestinian commitment to defeat the terrorism in its midst, no Israeli government, of the left or right, is likely to be in a position to move forward. And none of our diplomatic interlocutors offered any serious suggestions on how to deal with the terrorism.

            One point of agreement, though, was on the irreplaceable role of the United States. It is widely recognized that Washington offers the only hope for moving the peace process forward. The EU, UN, and Russia—the other three parties in the Quartet—are simply not trusted in Jerusalem. But will the Bush administration press ahead? That was a question on the minds of many, most notably the Europeans. The fear is that, faced with a quagmire in Iraq and an increasingly tough reelection bid, the last thing in the world the Bush team now wants, rhetoric notwithstanding, is to grapple again with Arab-Israeli issues. The Road Map was launched with great fanfare. Tragically, it aborted for the very same reason that the Clinton-Barak effort had failed—Arafat sabotaged it. We are, therefore, faced with a conundrum: Peace is not possible with Arafat, yet, given his unrivaled stature among Palestinians, peace may not possible, at least in the short term, without Arafat.

            The same reasoning that governed the administration in its first year in office, namely avoiding an issue that had consumed the Clinton team for years and ultimately failed to produce an agreement, could now return. Yet the conflict will not simply sit quietly until an administration in Washington is prepared to reengage it; it could explode at any moment, its ripple effects reaching far and wide. Thus, we saw grim faces among our European and moderate Arab interlocutors, but no well-conceived exit strategies to emerge from the current dire situation.

            Another point of agreement with some of our conversation partners was the recognition that the most likely strategy to jump-start the peace process was to think big, not small, even if the chances for success are quite low. In this spirit, we offered the example of Anwar Sadat. The most transformative moment in Arab-Israeli diplomacy over the past 55 years was Sadat’s dramatic visit to Jerusalem and his speech before the Knesset. Of course, the visit was preceded by secret diplomacy between Israel and Egypt. But once he set foot in Israel, and particularly in Israel’s capital, peace became not only possible but practically inevitable; war, on the other hand, became unthinkable.

            Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov replied to this notion by suggesting that Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah had also tried to think big with the plan he floated. Our response was that had he taken the risk of flying to Israel and announcing it there rather than through an American journalist, he might well have had a similar impact on the Israeli people as Sadat did in 1977. Instead, his impact was minimal.

            While admitting that the situation on the ground today may not be ripe for such historic gestures, we nonetheless urged leaders like EU foreign policy czar Javier Solana, Foreign Minister Ivanov, and Spanish Foreign Minister Ana Palacio to help plant the seeds for such a “big-vision” possibility that draws in the key Arab countries. Without them, and, of course, without the U.S., the prospects of a breakthrough are bleak.

            We also consistently raised two other important issues.

            The first dealt with the battery of some twenty anti-Israel resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly each year. Not only are these resolutions entirely one-sided, we argued, but they damage the image of the UN and undermine the search for peace. We zeroed in on three operational resolutions that fund a permanent and little-known UN structure which supports the Palestinian cause day in and day out.

            This well-funded and well-staffed structure, which includes the Division on Palestinian Rights in the Office of the Under Secretary General for Political Affairs, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, and the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs, and more, is funded by member countries and is used as a battering ram against Israel.

            Needless to say, there is nothing else in the UN structure that even comes close to approximating this institutionalized assault on a member state.

            The truth is that many government leaders are clueless about this entire apparatus. It’s too obscure. But one had to see the reaction of Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer when we explained the details to him. Not only was he surprised, but he immediately turned to his staff based at the UN and all but asked them why he hadn’t been informed of these annual votes. He promised us he would give the matter careful consideration. Other leaders, however, were not nearly as forthcoming; sadly, they were unwilling to rock the boat.

            The second issue dealt with anti-Semitism. We pressed the member countries of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to support a second conference on anti-Semitism next year, and I think we made some headway. We heard endorsements from, among others, President Chirac and Minister Palacio. We had been told that Britain objected to such a narrowly-based gathering, but Foreign Secretary Jack Straw appeared open to the idea in our meeting with him.

            While there’s progress to report on the second OSCE meeting, I came away from this round of diplomatic meetings once again disappointed by the general response to the upsurge in worldwide anti-Semitism. I’ve written on this previously (see “Letter from the Anti-Semitism Front,” August 2003), but still can’t quite grasp why there is such a lack of understanding. For some diplomats, the Jewish concern seems to be just another example of Jewish “overreaction,” if not “hysteria.” Or it simply doesn’t fit with their image of Jews as powerful. Or to acknowledge anti-Semitism in their own countries is to admit to problems that they’d prefer to gloss over. Or it’s an unfortunate but inevitable consequence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Or to focus on anti-Semitism, in their minds, runs the risk of antagonizing the Muslim world, which they don’t want to do.

            The one piece of potentially good news in the discussions on anti-Semitism came in the interagency meeting with President Chirac. While painfully slow to respond to the outbreak of attacks against French Jews from October 2000 to June 2002, he told us that the French government today has a “zero-tolerance” attitude on the subject and that punishment is “swift and severe.”

            This year’s Diplomatic Marathon is over, but the contacts continue. Next week, the Swiss foreign minister is visiting us, the following week we’ll be having a meal with the Spanish foreign minister in Madrid, and then a session with the German interior minister, whose portfolio includes counterterrorism, in Berlin. And on it goes.

            Unlike the New York Marathon with its precise distance, I don’t know when as an agency we’ll ever cross our finish line. But I do know that the collective stamina of the American Jewish Committee—our commitment to the long term and the resources we bring to bear in the effort—will ensure that there is a principled, sure-footed, and respected voice of the Jewish people in the global arena for as long as it takes.

Note: This is #35 in a series of monthly letters on topics of current interest. To receive copies of previous letters, please contact Rebecca Neuwirth at neuwirthr@ajc.org or 212-891-1403.