e-Letter 169: Golf Wars
April 13, 2003
Some may argue that Americans should worry about
more serious things than playing golf during war times. Others may wonder why
would anyone be so oblivious to Gulf War II as to wage their Golf War against
the Augusta National Golf Club during the Masters for not admitting women ("Burk
rails against Augusta, from afar," NBC News, April 12, 2003). Yet, in a
sense, this frivolity is also part of the strength of America where freedom of
expression also means the right to be wrong. It makes efforts such as Burk's
tolerable even if her priorities, timing, and partners have a lot to be
desired.
As the wars against terrorism and Iraq are taking
place simultaneously it may be helpful to view these as somewhat overlapping
but not fully related. The war on terrorism should have started long before
it did and the war on Iraq should have probably been completed in 1992 without
a need for a re-run in 2003. Yet, there is also a linkage between Iraq and
terrorism and the latter has the added threat that it was there during the
Saddam regime but is likely to survive his demise for many years to come. To
wit, examine a recent statement by Al-Qaida ("Al-Qa'ida
on the Fall of Baghdad," MEMRI, Special Dispatch - Jihad and Terrorism
Studies, April 11, 2003, No. 493) which views terrorism as a useful military
strategy: "Guerilla Warfare is the Most Powerful Weapon Muslims Have, and It
Is the Best Method to Continue the Conflict with the Crusader Enemy."
It is therefore disheartening - if expected - to
see the Arab reaction to the U.S.-led coalition's victory in Iraq. The Iraqi
regime continued, of course, to live its legacy of the imaginary 1001 Nights
lying through their teeth and moustaches to the western media but also to
their people, to the Arab world, and to themselves ("The
Baghdad Airport scam," Barry Rubin, The Jerusalem Post Apr. 7, 2003).
But it is not merely an official Iraqi
propagandist who promotes the big lie. Much of the Arab media is busy at
crafting it so ever artfully: "This amazingly brazen lie seemed like the last
gasp of denial from a regime on the verge of being overthrown. But that
interpretation was dead wrong. This story was not bizarrely unusual; it was
stupefyingly typical of what has been going on in the Arab world, and not just
Iraq, for decades. The big lie, the ridiculous exaggeration, whatever you
want to call it, is typical. Time after time, regarding Israel or on other
matters, Western media, governments, academics, and large elements of public
opinion have been accepting such things as accurate, or have at least put them
on a par with other versions of events. Now the lesson of the Baghdad Airport
scam should be learned once and for all: This is the way things work so very
often in the Arab world." Indeed, in interviews with Larry King on CNN and
Tony Snow on Fox, Lebanese, Jordanian, and other Arab reporters have adamantly
displayed their skill at distortion, hallucination, and the lack of
willingness to accept realities.
Little wonder then that the fall of the cash cow
and the sickening source of "moral support" for the Palestinians is officially
mourned by their very own corrupt and deadly regime ("Palestinian Authority
Mourns Fall of Baghdad," Itamar Marcus,
Palestinian Media Watch Bulletin, April 10, 2003).
If there is a silver lining it is found in the very rare articles that
recognize this Arab media congenital defect ("Editor
of the London Arabic Daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat Criticizes the Arab Media's War
Coverage," MEMRI, Special Dispatch -Saudi Arabia/ Reform Project, April 6,
2003, No. 491). The criticism is indeed harsh, suggesting that Arab media
today is even worse than in 1967 when newspapers and government radio and TV
stations reported that they are "advancing in all fronts" (against Israel) but
did not say in which direction as by the time they reported it their air
forces were decimated, their armored corps were destroyed and their infantry
was surrendering in droves or retreating barefoot. That is perhaps why even
after being vanquished in 1967 by Israel the Arab leaders were still declaring
"victory" and the masses believed them. The most serious grievance is raised
not against Arab broadcast of Iraqi lies but against the lack of choice. Of
not having a source of truth to be able to make an educated decision.
The war in Iraq was not only lost by the Saddam
regime but it has been won by the coalition in an unprecedented way ("Gulf
War II is first of its kind," Charles Krauthammer, April 10, 2003):
"...the first war ever aimed at destroying a totalitarian regime--and sparing
the invaded country. The surgical removal of a one-party police state while
trying to leave the civilians and the infrastructure as untouched as
possible..."
Part of the removal of the infrastructure and one
of the most important aspects of regime change has to do not only with
replacing the "leaders" and bombing military targets but also in undoing the
damage of decades of their rule. Reconstruction will have to be in the area
of education ("In
Bid to Shape a Postwar Iraq, U.S. Goes by the Schoolbook," David B.
Ottaway and Joe Stephens, Washington Post, April 6, 2003).
Some suggest - perhaps with foresight - that the
war on Iraq and the war on terrorism are but one segment in a much larger
picture that aims to address the need for further counter proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, counter terrorist activities and sources (of
support), and follow up with additional regime changes ("The
next war," Bret Stephens, The Jerusalem Post, Apr. 3, 2003).
While the U.S. and its allies are committed to
fighting terrorism - something Israel has proven as a must-have priority
decades ago - the adoption of terrorism as a strategy by the likes of Al-Qaida
demonstrates that this struggle is a continuous one for years to come. There
are other rogue regimes with weapons of mass destruction such as Syria and
Iran and indeed, recent statements from the Defense and State departments
indicate that they are in the U.S.'s cross hair. And lastly, regime change
may be necessary in more than just Iraq. It may be less likely to occur in
Egypt and Saudi Arabia but the need for it is only lesser to the need to
achieve change in Syria and Iran.
One who continuously refuses to get it is Tom
Friedman. Despite consistent messages from the president and administration
officials that there is no American intention to occupy or stay in Iraq,
Friedman seems to prefer to rely on Palestinian sources that "demand" the U.S.
does not become an occupier ("Watch
Out for Hijackers," The New York Times, April 6, 2003).
Perhaps Friedman's problem lies in his imperative statements: the "U.S. must"
("not occupy Iraq;" "show good will") almost as if the U.S. does not intend to
do so but if it will listen to Friedman it will do "the right thing."
Friedman then continues to rely on gross sloganeering and generalizations that
are absolutely erroneous ("The
Sand Wall," The New York Times, April 13, 2003).
For example, Friedman discusses Arab anger at the
U.S. as "Partly that's because their media willfully distorted what we did,
and partly it's because America has used its power out here more to defend oil
and Israel than democracy." How could an intelligent commentator suggest that
the U.S. has not defended democracy as if Israel is not the only democracy in
that region? That is exactly why the Arabs are angry at the U.S.: because of
the support of Israel not because the U.S. has not helped Arabs become
democracies (if that is what Friedman implies). Even if efforts at
democratizing Iraq will be successful (and it is a big if) Friedman should be
hard-pressed to demonstrate any democratic propensities in Arab societies in
the last century. Thus for him to take Arab disingenuous demands at face
value is more than irresponsible.
Friedman almost expects the results of the war to instantly flash on his TV
screen. Yet, as the "secularist" Iraqi regime has been ousted, the danger of
Islamism still lies ahead although explanations about its sources and
possibilities for change are elusive at best and are indicative that this war
is far from over ("'The
Crisis of Islam': Faith and Terrorism in the Muslim World," Kenneth M.
Pollack, The New York Times, April 6, 2003).
One explanation about the sources of the ugly,
extremist, Islamism of today is offered by Stephen Schwartz in a portrayal not
very complimenting to the Saudis and their followers ("The
Real Islam: An Interview with Stephen Schwartz," Kathy Bacon, Atlantic
Monthly, March 20, 2003).
He describes the Wahhabis infiltration into Afghanistan, Pakistan, the
Balkans, the Philippines, Western Europe, and of course America in their
efforts to attack those who don't believe as they do. Schwartz compares the
Wahhabis to the Nazis in the following manner: "Well, not all Nazis were
running to Auschwitz to pull the switch at the gas chambers. In fact, it was
noticeable in both the Nazi state and the Stalinist state that lots of people,
when it came down to whether or not they would sacrifice their conscience for
their ideology, wouldn't do it. But I don't know any Wahhabis who are like
that. Of course there are Wahhabis who are not directly involved in going off
and killing people, but they support the ideology that supports the people who
are going off and killing people. The difference is that the Wahhabis have a
religious dispensation that creates a totalistic sense of self-righteousness.
Nazism and Stalinism didn't have this."
Moreover, Schwartz argues that the modern wave of
genocidal terrorism aimed at killing civilians is rooted in Wahhabist ideology
and Saudi support for it: "...Hamas is a Saudi front. There is no argument
about this. The ideology of attacking civilians is a Wahhabi ideology. In the
Muslim tradition, the Muslim soldier fights soldier to soldier, as they fought
in Bosnia. The Muslim soldier does not attack children in a school bus, or
mothers walking down the street, or old people, or the infirm and sick. The
fact is that the whole wave of suicide terrorism is directly traceable to the
influence of the Saudis and Wahhabism among the Palestinians. If the Saudi
regime ever accepts that they can no longer export Wahhabism and can no longer
give money to Wahhabism as an extremist ideology, I think that would have a
salutary effect on a resolution in the Middle East."
The hope that Schwartz sees for the future lies in
inter-religious dialogue not in political negotiations, sort of a top down
approach that might prevail over current disputes: "...I do think that
Jewish-Muslim dialogue has a lot better chance in the short term than
Israeli-Arab dialogue. In my book, I call for what I term the "believers
peace," an attempt to bring the religious leaders together to find a way to
peace. I do think that if the grand rabbis, the mufti in Jerusalem, the Arab
patriarch, a Catholic patriarch, and a couple of Sufis could all sit down,
they could at least begin a dialogue. It's never been tried. And you know,
after the war in Bosnia we had a very successful interfaith council of Jews,
Catholics, Orthodox, and Muslims. If it can work in Bosnia, there should at
least be the beginning of an attempt at it in Jerusalem." Indeed this is the
exact approach that also should be implemented by public safety agencies in
the U.S. vis-a-vis the Arab/Muslim community which has not yet issued an
unconditional condemnation of terrorism.
This point of religious influence is evident when
examining the religious edicts - Fatwas - issued by various recognized
religious authorities and how contradictory they are ("Sheikh
Tantawi's Positions on Jihad Against Coalition Forces, Saddam's Resignation,
and The War in Iraq," Yotam Feldner, MEMRI, Inquiry and Analysis -
Egypt/Jihad and Terrorism Studies, April 8, 2003, No. 130): "Every few days,
Sheikh Tantawi, who is the highest-ranking cleric in Sunni Islam, declares a
position which seems to contradict the previous one. A look at statements made
by Sheikh Tantawi shows that he supports Jihad against coalition forces, and
supports suicide bombings. However, he is also in favor of the resignation of
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and is opposed to labeling the war in Iraq a
‘Crusader war.'"
The media coverage of the war has a lot to be
desired. The issue is more often focusing not merely on competent reporters
(or the lack thereof as in the case of Peter Arnett and Geraldo Rivera) but in
the framing of the reports and the context in which they are provided. It
appears that CNN has missed the point on when, how, and what to report by
admitting that its reporters were under threat by the Iraqi regime and thus
held news that might have been damaging to the regime ("The
News We Kept to Ourselves," Eason Jordan, The New York Times, April 11,
2003). How do we know that current reports from elsewhere do not suffer from
the same problems? How can we rely on the "credibility" of CNN reporting from
say the Palestinian territories when there is already ample clear evidence of
Palestinian threat and intimidation to foreign journalists?
One of the journalists who died while covering the
war will be particularly missed. Michael Kelly received a rare recognition by
fellow journalists in the form of a highly appreciative editorial ('Michael
Kelly, 1957-2003,' Editorial, The Jerusalem Post Apr. 5, 2003). The same
paper also reprinted one of Kelly's articles which originally ran in the
Washington Post on 8-15-2001 ("Mideast
myths exploded," Michael Kelly, The Jerusalem Post, Apr. 6, 2003).
Given the discussion on the "roadmap" Kelly's
comments are still as applicable today as when they were written. They are
even prophetic particularly when considering that the U.S. and the coalition
it leads has decided to engage in a preventive war: "In the face of this, in
the aftermath of an attack expressly and successfully designed to blow
children to bits, how dare a smug, safe-in-his-bed American secretary of state
urge "restraint" by "both sides"? How does the secretary imagine his own
country would respond to such a "provocation" as the Sbarro mass murder? (His
own country bombed Serbia to its knees for killing ethnic Albanians in distant
Kosovo, let alone Americans on American soil.) And when you get down to it,
why, exactly, should Israel continue to exercise restraint? Why shouldn't it
go right ahead and escalate the violence? The only point to waging war is to
win. Israel is at war, and losing. It can win only by fighting the war on its
terms, unleashing an overwhelming force (gosh, just what is called for in the
Powell Doctrine) to destroy, kill, capture and expel the armed Palestinian
forces that have declared war on Israel. So far, Israel has indeed chosen to
practice restraint. But, at this point, it has every moral right to abandon
that policy and to engage in the war on terms more advantageous to military
victory. This is a matter for Israel, at war, to decide one way or the other.
Whether Secretary Powell purses his lips or not."
Say this much for the Europeans: they are wrong but they are consistently so.
From their perspective they do not even consider themselves being obsequious
at that. Perhaps it takes a Frenchman to expose the shenanigans of the French
under Chirac's regime ("France
is Not a Western Country Anymore," Guy Milliere, FrontPageMagazine.com |
March 31, 2003): "I am French, and I must say if Americans knew completely
what's happening in France, the French-bashing would be far harsher." It
appears as if the Americans and the Brits are getting the negative French
sentiments for what they are intended. After all, how difficult is it to
understand the French when they spray graffiti desecrating British graves
(from WWI) with statements to "take your filthy bodies out of our soil" so as
not to "contaminate it." Even a letter from Chirac to Queen Elizabeth was far
from a sincere apology. He merely expressed "regret" at the desecration but so
do universities and employers when they deny admission or hiring - they
express regret ("Chirac
Apologizes for Vandalized Graves," John Tagliabue, New York Times, April
4, 2003).
Yet, it is these strange bed fellows, the leaders of Belgium, France, Germany
and Russia that opposed the war on Iraq, wanted to finish it before its time,
and now want to exert influence over the rebuilding of Iraq as well as over
the "peace process" in the Middle East. Germany's Fischer, in an outright
poking at the U.S., even went to visit Arafat - who is no longer a player ('To
Joshka Fischer,' Editorial, The Jerusalem Post, April 8, 2003).
Indeed the Europeans are in a sense imitating the Saddam regime. They are
declining in stature and influence but are not willing to recognize the fact.
Instead they behave as if they have a rightful place at the table where they
did not want to be seated when invited ("A
declining Europe," George Will," April 11, 2003).
As the war on the Iraqi regime is getting close to its predicted end, sounds
of the "next step" in diplomatic efforts are aimed at Israel and its expected
magnanimity in further "promoting" the peace process. Mostly President Bush
is pressured by Britain's Blair, the Europeans, the Russians the U.N. (All
part of the "quartet") and his State Department but in contradistinction to
his own June 24th speech and the principles he outlined there for any progress
towards real peace. In contrasting the situation in Iraq with that of the
Palestinians it is evidently clear that the latter should not be treated any
differently than the Iraqis and similarly that if the U.S. can take care of
its national interests in Iraq, Israel should be permitted to do the same
particularly when it pertains to it national security ("If
it's good for Arafat...," David M. Weinberg, The Jerusalem Post, Apr. 5,
2003).
The current plan known as the "roadmap" is nothing more than a guarantee to
drive Israel into a ditch. It has two main deficiencies. First, it rewards
terrorism, second, nothing has truly changed in the Palestinian landscape
including the selection of a "new" prime minister ("Punishing
and Rewarding Terrorism," Rachel Ehrenfeld, The New York Sun, Apr 9,
2003).
Yet it is also reasonable to suggest that despite
the risks and dangers it poses for Israel these risks and dangers may not come
to fruition after all ("Road
map, road kill," Jonathan Tobin, Jewish World Review, April 4, 2003). If
there is light at the end of this tunnel (and it is not from a locomotive) it
lies in the growing understanding in the U.S. of the pathological ties between
the Palestinians and Iraq, the headquartering of terror in Syria, and the
important role that the Christians voice is playing in conservative politics:
"First, don't assume that everybody in the administration is an idiot...
Second, don't underestimate the stupidity of the Palestinians... Third, don't
underestimate the will of the Israelis....Finally, don't underestimate the
support for Israel among the American people... Victory in Iraq may bring
peril for Israel. But those who assume the worst aren't necessarily right.
Though it looks like the Quartet juggernaut may turn the Israelis into road
kill, a lot can happen to derail that collision before it happens." The
problem of course, that this is a risky game. The dangers of the roadmap are
not inevitable yet they will not disappear just by trying to wish them away.
A far better approach is offered in a paper
released by the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy ("WINNING THE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE
EAST: A BIPARTISAN BLUEPRINT FOR POST-WAR U.S. POLICY," Dennis Ross,
Robert Satloff, Patrick Clawson, David Makovsky and Mattew Levitt, Volume 3,
Issue 17, April 9, 2003). It has two basic premises: first, the post-war
Iraq has to be stabilized enough to obtain the full aspiration for a positive
regime change that will auger well for peace efforts and democracy, and
second, develop the possible peace in the Middle East between Israelis and
Palestinians along a track that has hope for the long term by the removal of
the terror infra-structure, the support, aid, and abetment given to it by
various Arab leaders. While the document lacks some specifics, it is filled
with various euphemisms, and it gives too much credit to the new Palestinian
prime minister, it certainly has far more promise than the roadmap in its
current form and with its current sponsors of whom neither the U.N., the
Europeans, nor the Russians should really be part of.
Perhaps some of the best news from the area are those that did not happen: No
SCUDs on Israel. Yet children and teachers (still) have to go to school
carrying their personal gas mask kits. Just imagine these scenes in the U.S.
in order to comprehend the extent to which freedom has been challenged to a
level of an existential threat. Think about the two weeks when the sniper(s) terrorized
the nation's capital to understand the challenges that Israel and the U.S.
face. There are others in that boat too but it is up to them to recognize it
and act accordingly.
Thus far neither the Arabs nor the Europeans, the
Russians or the U.N., are giving any indications they even know where the boat
is or that their boat(s) could be in as much danger.
Stay tuned.
© Robbie Friedmann, Ph.D.
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