e-Letter 171: The road not to be taken
(with thanks to Robert Frost)
April 26, 2003
The war in Iraq is not even officially over yet
and criticism for the looting of its national museum are already leveled at
the U.S. for "failing to protect" it while "protecting the building of the oil
ministry." It is not even clear whether it was a mob looting or whether it
was an organized robbery by the regime itself but irrespective of what will be
found out the blame and the responsibility lie with the Iraq whether the mob
or its government did it ("An
Iraqi Tragedy," Daniel Pipes, New York Post, April 22, 2003).
Iraq may have been liberated of its ruthless despot but not yet from the deep
hate for Israel. Not to what Israel does but to Israel period. Recent
demonstrations in Karbala were copycats of Iranian denouncement of Israel and
in all likelihood instigated by their Shiite "brothers" from Iran ("The
chronic despair of an optimist," The Jerusalem Post, Apr. 24, 2003).
As the Shiite clergy is vying to fill in the leadership vacuum it is
imperative to cleanse Iraq not just from a deck of cards of 54 "most wanted"
but from the thousands of bureaucrats who made that regime possible. Nothing
short of a repeat of the de-Nazification that followed WWII is now a must in
Iraq for what used to be the
Baath ruling party ("Draining
Iraq's Baath: Regime change isn't enough. We must make sure the party's over,"
The Wall Street Journal, April 25, 2003). The resemblance to Nazism is not
coincidental by any means. The name of the party stands (not only in Iraq but
in several other Arab countries) for national socialism which is what the
Nazis stood
for.
And indeed, strong criticism against a sister Baath regime was leveled
recently by Arab sources ("Kuwaiti
Paper Criticizes Syria: Assad's Regime More Criminal than Saddam's Regime,"
MEMRI, Special Dispatch - Kuwait/Syria, April 22, 2003, No. 495) arguing that
Syria has no hope of change and that if it is likely to follow the example of
Iraq it may share its fate.
That is why comments by Secretary Rumsfeld that the U.S. will no tallow an
Islamist government in Iraq are welcome. While historically there was no love
lost between Iraq and Syria, in the same manner that Iraq found a welcoming
home for its - never returned - airplanes in Iran (with which it had a bloody
war a decade earlier) the Syrians have offered support for the Iraqi war
effort and then safe haven for Iraqi war criminals and weapons of mass
destruction. Syrian media "criticized the U.S. as "defying international
legitimacy," charged that America's actions are "Genocide," "War Crimes,"
"Terrorism," and "Nazi Actions," that in attacking Iraq, the U.S. was doing
Israel's bidding and completely ignored the fall of Baghdad ( "Syrian
Government and Media on the War in Iraq," Steven Stalinsky and Eli Carmeli,
MEMRI, Inquiry & Analysis - Syria/Iraq, April 21, 2003, No. 134).
Charges that the U.S.'s real interests in Iraq
were driven by oil are by now old - and still repeated - mantras. Oil was
indeed a factor but with a twist: It was the bribe Saddam paid to France,
Russia, and China and that is why these countries opposed the war against Iraq
("No Oil
for Blood," Dick Morris, New York Post, April 22, 2003) - and the lifting
of U.N. sanctions now - yet conveniently it was the U.S. who got stuck with
the charge.
Even worse, many other charges against the anti-Iraq coalition focused on its
"colonial and imperial character" and reading much of the western, and
particularly European press, one might think that the U.S. is the culprit in
Iraq. It is worth reviewing how these arguments are debunked one by one ("Wrong
and wronger," Bret Stephens, The Jerusalem Post, Apr. 16, 2003).
In is rather surprising to find a respected
analyst going so far as suggesting that with the demise of Iraq (as a military
entity) Israel is no longer in danger of having an "eastern front" - led by
Iraq - against her ("A
Pesah Miracle," Pesach = Passover, R.F., Ehud Ya'ari, The Jerusalem
Report, May 5, 2003): "Given that Egypt, so far as one can predict, is
committed to a "cold peace" with Israel, Iraq's exit from the circle of
belligerency leaves Syria alone, or to be more accurate, with only its distant
ally and neighbor, Iran. And that alliance presents only a modest threat to
Israel as long as Iran does not obtain nuclear capability."
In this case the devil is not in the details but
in the qualifiers. "So far as one can predict Egypt is committed to cold
peace;" the remaining alliance (Syria and Iran) "presents only a modest
threat...as long as Iran does not obtain nuclear capability." This is like
saying that a dangerous homicidal maniac is out there in the streets and poses
no danger unless he kills again......Yaari seems to minimize the likelihood -
or better say speed - of Iran' going nuclear.
Perhaps it takes a non-expert to provide the
logical counterpoint. While Yaari may be splitting hairs as to when (or even
"if") Iran will pose a nuclear threat, others argue that its nuclear
capability has passed the point of no return ("Thinking
the Unthinkable: The Iranian nuclear program may now have passed the point of
no return, shifting the balance of power to Israel's enormous disadvantage,"
David Horovitz, The Jerusalem Report, May 5, 2003): "In the "best case"
scenario, it is a regime that, barring intervention, will have nuclear weapons
within two years, but there are pessimists in the international intelligence
community who believe it has gone nuclear already... Terrorism is an all too
undeniable element in the Teheran strategic armory. The regime orchestrated
the two Buenos Aires bombings in 1992 and 1994. It inspires, trains and arms
Hizballah. It encourages and supports Hamas... The existential concern for
Israel relates to similarly cold-hearted strategists in Iran, calculating
whether, in a nuclear confrontation, they might be able to wipe out Israel
while sacrificing only a proportion of their populace. However unthinkable
that may sound, with Iran now so dangerously empowered, and the West unwilling
and perhaps unable to counter that threat, the only factor preventing such a
scenario is the purported pragmatism of the regime in Teheran."
Part of the problem of post-Iraq "nation building"
is the insistence on keeping Iraq as a "unified country." Given its history,
its ethnic composition, and internal rivalries it is worth examining other
alternatives than keeping Iraq "under one roof." Indeed in a sense the
solution to the Iraqi problem may have direct positive implications to the
Palestinian problem but also to the predicament of Jordan ("Jordan
is Palestine and Iraq," Yosef Goell, The Jerusalem Post, Apr. 20, 2003):
"After creating an independent or autonomous Kurdistan in the north, the
southern two thirds of Iraq should be merged with Jordan under the Hashemite
crown as payment for its own readiness to incorporate the Palestinian
territories and population...It could in time also serve to resettle the
Palestinian refugees from their sordid, dehumanizing camps in Gaza, the West
Bank, Lebanon and Syria, a problem the road map fails to address."
Can we survive the week without an input or two
from Tom Friedman? One could wish. Friedman had two pieces this week that
show how dangerous it is to give a pen to someone who likes to shoot from the
hip.
First he makes the ludicrous suggestion ("The
Third Bubble," Thomas L. Friedman, The New York Times, April 20, 2003)
that "the terrorism bubble was the product of a kind of temporary insanity, in
which basic norms were ignored and excessive behavior was justified by new
theories." In other words, he believes that we have just witnessed nothing
short of the end to terrorism. Obviously from now on terrorists will no
longer resort to "excessive behavior" or have to plead "temporary insanity."
They will just ride buses instead of blowing them up and take the elevators in
skyscrapers instead of ramming planes into them. Perhaps hard-pressed
politicians (for votes) might resort to such irresponsible statements but from
a sober commentator? Will he swallow his pen and paper when the next major
terrorism event happens (he defines "major" only against the U.S.; for him a
bus bombing in Israel is "probably "normal"). Do not hold your breath. I
heard Middle Eastern experts suggesting they will resign from their
prestigious university if their analysis will prove to be wrong and they are
still there writing additional scholarly and popular articles not letting
reality bother them a bit. So will Friedman. Yet, he ought to be reminded
when the next terror event takes place.
Then he comes out with yet another pearl. For him
post Iraq improvement depends on an Israeli-Palestinian settlement. He is
offering a regime change for the Palestinians - which is a rather welcome
proposition, until one sees that Friedman limits his regime change to "easing
Arafat out ("Regime
Change, Part 2," Thomas L. Friedman, The New York Times, April 20,
2003) and not trying to denazify the regime itself: "In the near future — once
Iraqi politics really resume — the ability of any Iraqi politician to be
openly pro-U.S. will be restricted if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict burns
on and the Bush team is seen as siding only with Ariel Sharon and doing
nothing to defuse the situation."
Yet, reading his article one could get two more
impressions: first that Sharon is the biggest obstacle to peace in the Middle
East and that Iraq is not responsible enough with the business of nation
building unless they are given a peace agreement between Israel and the
Palestinians. That was one of the arguments against the war as well, namely,
that the issue will have to be resolved prior to attacking Iraq. It was wrong
then and it is wrong now. Yet it is typical to Friedman's shallowness: "The
Europeans and Arabs missed their chance to be part of Saddam's removal. But
they can contribute now by being part of the easing aside of Mr. Arafat. At
the same time, U.S. conservatives who supported war against Iraq need to
understand that if they miss this chance to help nurture an alternative
Palestinian leadership — by refusing to make demands on Mr. Sharon— not only
will Israel be less safe in the long run, but chances of President Bush
succeeding in Iraq will be diminished." Friedman must have forgotten the
concessions Israel made which only resulted in more violence. Perhaps he
ought to take a long vacation. It will allow the New York Times to publish
some article by Yassir Arafat.
Friedman is standing right there with CNN in terms
of losing credibility as a reporter. Perhaps that is why he is now a
"columnist." As one writer suggested, Friedman is guilty of concealing
information in a very similar manner ("Trading
truth for access?" Jeff Jacoby, The Boston Globe, 4/17/2003): "When ''the
name of the game'' becomes ''keeping on good terms'' with the world's most
evil men, journalism turns into something awfully hard to distinguish from
collaboration. It didn't start with Eason Jordan, and it didn't end in
Baghdad."
So what are the implications of the victory in Iraq on the looming Israeli
-Palestinian negotiations? One expert suggests that its outcome depends on
the amount of pressure the U.S. may be able to exert on the Palestinians for
political reform ("What
does victory mean?" Barry Rubin, The Jerusalem Post, Apr. 15, 2003):
"The issue has perhaps less to do with the Iraq war itself than the
accompanying American analysis of pressuring the Palestinians for political
reform that would result in a leadership willing to make a compromise peace
with Israel." The real question is not the amount of American pressure but
the Palestinians' own willingness and capability at reforming. That one is in
its second century of testing without the desired results as of yet.
The "roadmap" continues to hover in the background and will in all likelihood
be unfolded in the coming week. The problem is that the map is unrealistic
and the road is not one to be taken even if it was less traveled by (with
homage to"The Road Not Taken by Robert
Frost) and it may be so complex - or the circumstances surrounding it and
the possibilities it offers or ignores - that a road map is needed to read the
road map ("Reading
the road map," Barry Rubin, The Jerusalem Post, Apr. 22, 2003).
And if diplomacy is complicated there is an added element of religion and
religious interest in the outcome that cannot, should not, and probably will
not be ignored. That actually adds some hope to the predicament that Israel
finds itself given the imposed never-ending demands for concessions that
eventually pose existential risks ("For
a 'Christian road map,'" Michael D. Evans, The Jerusalem Post, Apr. 21,
2003).
The Palestinian charade continues unabated.
Arafat and Abu Mazen played out their brinkmanship to the last minute when
they agreed to "cooperate and form the cabinet that the latter proposed and
the former approved ("Arafat,
Abbas agree on new Palestinian government," Margaret Coker, The Atlanta
Journal-Constitution, 4/24/03). But not before the "irrelevant" Arafat
managed to Humpty-Dumpty himself again into a position of influence "forcing"
various world and Arab leaders to call and beg/threaten him to "agree" to the
new cabinet, or else. Thus Arafat regained his posture of power without
having to lift a finger and is likely to continue to sabotage any efforts at
real peace.
This was a classical game of "good cop bad cop"
(with apologies to cops for dragging them into this metaphor). Abu Mazen may
not have blood on his hands and Israelis may feel more comfortable with him as
an enemy than with Arafat but the fact remains that he has a history replete
with holocaust denial and support of terrorism. Now he displays tactical
differences with Arafat but with complete agreement about the end-goal: the
destruction of Israel ('Mahmoud
Abbas's task,' Editorial, The Jerusalem Post, Apr. 25, 2003).
Abu Mazen simply believes - as he himself stated -
that their goal can be obtained without resorting to terrorism. To date he
has not condemned terrorism for its inherent evil but condemned it because it
has not obtained the Palestinian goals (as of yet). Thus Israel finds herself
in cycles of violence and cycles of peace. Not between her and the
Palestinians but between one Palestinian tactic and another.
The reality is that even today Palestinian
terrorism continues unabated. The fact that Israel had "only one" suicide
bomber last week is not due to lack of trying. Concurrently, the Palestinian
campaign of hate indoctrination also continues unabated. Fresh as Mahmmud
Abbas' (of the Achile Lauro "fame") capture was the Palestinians already
"demanded" his release because he had a sort of "diplomatic immunity." In
their systematic campaign of lies and deceit their education system and
official propaganda produced several hate videos showing the "Torture"
of a Palestinian Prisoner (Palestinian
Media Watch, Multi-media Bulletin, April 24, 2003), a music video
depicting Israelis
as terrorist murderers, and one showing how
Palestinian children can
destroy Judaism.
The focus of "new" Arab discourse on the
manifestation of antisemitism is fairly new and is limited to the last two
years which are arguably the worse in expressions of antisemitism at an
unprecedented scale and scope. Carmon sites examples such as the "calls to
cancel the Beirut Holocaust Deniers' Conference," the Saudi Editor who
"apologized for publishing blood libel," "criticism of antisemitic series on
Egyptian television," and the "new recommendation by Al-Azhar: Stop Calling
Jews 'Apes and Pigs'"
While there is some public discourse condemning
the manifestations of antisemitism it is important to note two important
elements. First, the focus is on the manifestations of antisemitism yet not on
antisemitism itself. Second, this discourse demonstrate a nuance shift of
tactics and not of strategy. The best examples to support this point is in
the contradictory fatwas issued by Al Azhar on one hand and the series of
article written by a top Egyptian diplomat (see the section on Osama Al-Baz in
e-Letter 157:
Yet another year of the terrorists, January 5, 2003).
If Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Syria are
examples of the vulgar antisemitism that is government-issued and controlled,
other Arab countries are in danger of shifting to that line of extremism and
Morocco is a good example of how undercurrents of Islamism could topple a
moderate monarchy by adopting the narrative that includes the historical
vilification of Jews ("Islamism,
Moroccan-Style: The Ideas of Sheikh Yassine," Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, The
Middle East Forum, Winter 2003).
While many may be tired of the war in Afghanistan
and Iraq, hoping that war and terrorism are over, the shift of tectonic plates
has only just begun. The great American wrote about the road not taken and
the post-war roadmap that is supposed to bring settlement to the Middle East
is a road not to be taken. In a sense there is another road that could and
even should be taken and that road is the one that does not reward terrorism,
that promotes total regime change for the Palestinians accompanied with the
total eradication of hateful indoctrination, stipulates a long waiting period
to verify that terrorism is over, and most important, points to an actual
possibility of the end-to-the-conflict. Anything short of that will bring
about even more terrorism - and not only for Israel. This, simply because of
the verifiable perception that terrorism pays. It will also allow tricks such
as the Oslo Accord or the current roadmap to absolve the Palestinians from any
responsibility for genuine change.
Last week an American-educated Saudi banker was
interviewed on National Public radio (NPR) and she lamented about how bad the
current American behavior is and what is it that the U.S. needs to be doing to
win over Arab and Muslim hearts. As long as this arrogant one-way "thinking"
will be prevalent no resolution of any conflict is possible. Not for Israel
and not for the U.S. Only when the Arabs will start caring about what
Americans thinks about them and what should they do to be more "liked" this
asymmetric relationship will lead to continued disaster. A solution requires
the participation of both sides and the Arabs and Muslims have only shown
their destructive side so far. It is high time to change this equation.
© Robbie Friedmann, Ph.D.
To view
previous e-Letters:
Additional e-Letters and articles:
*
* *
*
Text of the e-Letter includes hyperlinks to the source
articles (where available).
* Your feedback, comments,
suggestions, and your referral of additional sources is
appreciated. Please provide complete and precise
web link addresses (URL).
* This e-Letter has been sent for
the use of the intended recipients. The message may
contain information that is privileged or confidential.
* As a recipient of this e-Letter you have permission
to distribute it.
* Should you wish to be taken
off this mailing list please indicate so in a return
e-mail.
* * *