June 15, 2003

 

The "peace process" speeds on and the Palestinians claim that Israel does not want peace while they unabashedly state that what they want is to destroy Israel.  Strange logic the terrorists have. They can be the aggressors and the victims at the same time; they claim the right to kill, to commit genocide ("Hamas vows to 'tear Israel to pieces' after Gaza attack," Sa'id Ghazali in Jerusalem and Rupert Cornwell in Washington, The Independent, 13 June 2003); they justify their action through racist and religious rhetoric; they inflict revenge even before there is a reason for one; and then they "complain" that the victim is not willingly to cooperate. But let there be no doubt: They are successful. Very. They succeeded in instilling fear, in legitimizing their base, in receiving support, and in influencing international politics.  They even are addressed very respectfully by "reporters" such as Geraldo Rivera who "properly" refer to their leaders as "Dr." (Rantisi) and politely wish them "good luck" at the end of the interview ("Geraldo at large," Fox, June 14, 2003).   And the terrorists laugh all the way to the (Saudi) bank.

 

The Saudis of course argue that they are not supporting terror, that they are cracking down on money lines to terrorists (which means they supported it at least until then - assuming the crackdown is real), and that the only support they have for organizations such as Hamas is for "charity" purposes although admittedly they do not always know what is done with the money ("Saudis admit funding Hamas," World Tribune.com, June 13, 2003): 
"Riyad funds organizations that could relay money to the ‘political wing of Hamas for charities they manage in the occupied territories.' Whether these are families that have lost a loved one to violence, we do not know." Lost a loved one to violence is a euphemism for suicide bombing except that for the Saudis killing Israelis is not considered terrorism.

 

Indeed, they continue with their relentless vilification campaign against Israel and Jews, resorting to old anti-Semitic canards about Jews, money, and domination of world organizations projecting unto the Jews what the Saudis themselves are practicing ("Three Saudi Dailies Publish Government Official's Op-Ed: ‘Jews are Masters at Manipulating the Media, Money, World Organizations,'" MEMRI, Special Dispatch Series - No. 521, June 11, 2003). 

 

And this rhetoric is by no means limited to Saudi Arabia.  The scandal that engulfed the New York Times draws perhaps even more attention to not so always obvious biases of the paper and indeed other papers such as the New Yorker. Whether intended or not, some of these newspapers adopt terms of reference that while appearing "innocuous" are at the same time loaded with anti-Semitic meaning to the extent that at least one respected columnist felt he had to point it out ("Joining LaRouche In the Fever Swamps: The New York Times and The New Yorker go off the deep end," Robert L. Bartley, The Wall Street Journal, Monday, June 9, 2003). 

Yet the Saudis are far more blatant about their vilification campaign.  And in the Nazi tradition of the technique of the big lie they claim that Israeli children are systematically taught to hate, again projecting unto them the Saudis' own indoctrination of their children and the children of those they support ("Saudis fabricate report of Jews teaching hatred: 'Study' made up quotes, facts, to prove Israeli kids want Arabs to 'burn in hell,'" Art Moore, June 13, 2003, WorldNetDaily.com).

 

There may be un underlying reason for this scapegoating. After all it is easier to deflect real troubles to imagined ones and as long as they can contribute to instability - which is in their interest - they can displace any potential criticism from the Saudi rulers.  Given the potential shake-up in the sphere of influence in the oil industry, the Saudis are facing a double loss: a loss of revenue and with it a loss of valuable influence on pricing and world politics ("The Saudi Nightmares about Iraqi Oil," Dr. Nimrod Raphaeli, MEMRI, Inquiry and Analysis - Saudi Arabia/Economic Studies, June 12, 2003, No. 137): "Saudi Arabia's weight as a Middle Eastern power is measured by its oil reserves and its overwhelming influence in OPEC. If OPEC's role is to diminish as a result of independent Iraqi oil policies, or perhaps even to disintegrate, the consequences for Saudi Arabia's political influence are enormous. Beyond the economics of pricing, oil contributes 85 percent of Saudi government revenues. As an exporter of approximately 7.5 million b/d, a decline of $1 dollar per barrel would translate into a loss of $2.7 billion annually. A decline of $10 per barrel translates into a nightmare for the regime struggling to meet the needs of a rising population and correspondingly rising unemployment."
 
The positioning of the new power play within the Palestinian camp has reached a new (if not original) level with Arafat becoming the target of criticism as an inciter of Hamas by no other than his own "prime minister" ("Abbas threatens to resign, charges Arafat incited Hamas," World Tribune.com,  June 12, 2003).  By making Arafat "look bad" Abbas is trying to "look good." No; not to the Palestinians where his popularity does not rival that of Arafat but to the West which still considers Abbas the interlocutor of the day who "will deliver" (why expect this from one who was Arafat's right hand man for the last four decades does not enter into the political calculations).  This, despite his repeated mantras such as the "right of return" and not wanting to deal with extremists by force ("After 1,000 Days," William Safire, The New York Times, June 9, 2003).  

 

The problem is that the West is buying much of the Palestinian rhetoric. After all, there is a "prime minister" for a non country and Israelis and Palestinians are perceived to be engaged in a "cycle of violence" as if victim and perpetrator have an equal footing ('Cycle of violence'? Joseph Farah, WorldNetDaily.com, June 13, 2003). Yet some, like Farah, point out the difference between terror and defense against it, and correctly assesses the potential mortal danger for Israel: "There are only two advantages Israel has over its enemies: It is right, and it has military might. If Israel doesn't utilize those two strengths – and soon – the world will soon witness another Jewish holocaust. It will be too late. If Israel tries to buy its way out of its current turmoil by yielding to demands for more strategic land concessions, it will be making a fatal mistake. The "road map" is only a blueprint for murder and mayhem. It is a prescription for more terrorism. It is a plan for disaster in the Middle East. The U.S. must stop coercing Israel. And Israel must not accept the arm-twisting any longer." 

 

Somehow in the "intellectual debate" that equates victim with offender the fact that non-combating citizens get killed falls by the wayside.  On one hand there is a recognition that targeting Hamas leaders may play into the hands of Abbas by giving him an easy exit strategy for "not being able to deliver" because of Israel's actions but the focus of Israel must be on minimizing the possibility of the next terror attack. If anything, the criticism against Israel by its own press is that it waited too long with the offensive against Hamas and it should not stop it now ("No turning back," Editorial, The Jerusalem Post, Jun. 12, 2003).
 
Given the blatantly genocidal statements and actions by Hamas ("Rantisi: We will drive all Jews out of Palestine," Khaled Abu Toameh, The Jerusalem Post, Jun. 11, 2003) Israelis were deeply frustrated with comments from the White House that the President is "troubled" by the attempt on the Hamas leader. One editorial pointed to the role model the U.S. itself has posed for fighting terrorism ("We, too, are deeply troubled," Editorial, The Jerusalem Post, Jun. 10, 2003): "Like Bush, we too are deeply troubled by yesterday's attempt to take out a mass murderer of our fellow citizens. We are troubled because Rantisi has lived to murder another day. We wish the air force better luck in the future in carrying out its mission of safeguarding the lives of Israeli citizens from the murderous likes of Rantisi." Another article compared Bush to Clinton whom he criticized for not being patient enough on the Mideast yet Bush seems to be impatient himself ("George W. Clinton," Michael Freund, The Jerusalem Post, June 11, 2003).
 

Interestingly, the White House changed its tune later last week and seemed to be backing of from its initial criticism of Israel ("White House Backs Latest Israeli Attacks," Glenn Kessler, Washington Post, June 13, 2003).  This morning President Bush was unequivocally clear of what needs to be done ("Bush: Free world must deal harshly with Hamas," the Associated Press, Jun. 15, 2003): "It is clear that the free world and those who love freedom and peace must deal harshly with Hamas and the killers,"

 

While this may appear as inconsistent policy and even confusing leadership where Israel is criticized one day for an action and is backed up on it the following day (and inversely, Arabs pleased the first day and disappointed the next) it provides the diplomats room to maneuver between the feuding parties by giving each something they want to hear.  Statements are important diplomatic cash showing each side that there are limits to what it can do.  But they are meaningless without the realities on the ground and there the U.S. is pursuing the continuation of the roadmap and as a (powerful) mediator it then cashes on these statements when it deals with the rivals in the Mideast.

 

The pop journalistic icon, the Dr. Phil of the New York Times, does not write about the tribulations and loss of credibility of his own paper but he has a solution for the Mideast.  Assessing that "both sides" are "self-destructing" he believes the "only" solution is for the U.S. to send troops ("The Reality Principle" Thomas L. Friedman, The New York Times,  June 15, 2003).  The U.S. may have to send troops but not to prevent self-destruction. Rather, to prevent the terror threat to targets American interests by Hamas or pursue them if materialized. Israel can take care of its defense needs without external intervention and do so even better without international restraint.  But Friedman has to equate criminal with victim and never once is asking why do the Palestinians need so many security forces and why haven't these security forces prevented terrorism to date and why have they been part of the terror network.  Tolerating it is the problem.

 

Indeed, a good lesson from the Oslo experience to the roadmap is offered by one analyst who argues that Oslo failed because the Palestinian violations (and violence) was tolerated. For the roadmap to succeed it is important to exercise a zero tolerance policy for any Palestinian transgressions on terror, violence, and incitement ("Learning from Oslo," Daniel Pipes, New York Post, June 10, 2003).  "The White House last fall established a "zero tolerance" policy for Iraqi violations of U.N. resolutions; it must do likewise today with the Palestinians: Any incitement or sanctioned violence stops the process cold. Doing so will permit the Bush administration to help bring about Palestinian-Israeli reconciliation. But ignoring the violence will only make things even worse than they are now."

 

Yet it does not appear that the U.S. (or even Israel) is going to apply a zero tolerance policy and hence the likelihood of the roadmap to succeed is not high given that its assumptions are faulty and that the conditions stipulated in it are not enforced. In fact some strategists suggest the U.S. cut its losses with the roadmap before the cost will be even higher for the U.S. ("Road Map, Road Kill," Frank J Gaffney Jr., FrontPageMagazine.com | June 12, 2003): "Of course, the prospect of abandoning the road map so early on may be embarrassing. The attendant political costs of doing so, however, will pale into insignificance compared to those associated with continuing to invest the President's limited capital and prestige in a peace process doomed to fail, given that it is rooted in faulty assumptions and moral equivalence.  It is time to accord our free, democratic Israeli ally the same latitude for countering terrorist threats to its people and society that we insist upon for ourselves. Mr. Bush did precisely that last June, as he clearly and thoughtfully conditioned his support for a Palestinian state. A failure to do so now will bring no just and durable peace to the region. To the contrary, a weakened Israel, perceived to have lost the support of its American security partners and confronting the world's newest terrorist state, is an invitation to the Middle East's next - and potentially most devastating - war to date." 

 

The problem of equating victim with perpetrator and elevating the perpetrator to a party that has rights to commit its crimes is most evident in intellectual circles that shape public opinion.  The failure of what passes for some intellectuals is what is defined by one scholar as "reverse hypocrisy" ("Losing the War of Words," Yair Sheleg, Ha'aretz | June 13, 2003): "A hypocritical person acts differently than to what he preaches. Israelis actually behave correctly, but are unable to ground this behavior in the suitable intellectual explanations: On the one hand, people are willing to risk their lives in a war, but on the other hand they are such cowards in the one battle that really matters - the battle of words and ideas."

 

It was offered heard that political objectives cannot be won by war or by war alone.  Despite proof to the contrary (say, WWII) there is room to argue that war are not won only by equipment but also by the human spirit (and mind).  If the spirit and the mind fails to properly identify the threats, dangers, and realities on the ground, certainly no military equipment alone will achieve any victory.  Therefore the battle that needs to be won is the battle for ideas, the battle for support of those ideas, and the battle for truth and justice.