e-Letter 188: Would the French recognize their enemy or become one?

 

September 20, 2003

 

The devastation and horror that human weapons ("suicide bombers") wreak upon the free world is evident in the perception that has become a myth: nothing could stop an individual bound on killing him/herself and taking many others in the process.  If the observation is limited to a specific individual that is quite correct.  Yet a study reported last week ("Demystify It: How to defeat suicide terrorism," Adam Wolfson, National Review Online, September 16, 2003) draws attention to the fact that "suicide-attacks are nearly always carefully calibrated to accomplish the political goals of nationalists groups" that this strategy "is nearly always deployed as part of a larger political-military campaign" and that "Every suicide attack in the period under study was launched against a democracy."

 

Hence the conclusion is that human-weapons terrorism is indeed deferrable by focusing on the handlers rather than on those who actually carry out the attacks.  One way of getting to the handlers is by tracking down the funding that fuels this heinous strategy ("Trail of Funds: Getting at the terror paymasters," Rachel Ehrenfeld, September 16, 2003): "Clearly, unless we demand and enforce methods to stop all funding to all terrorists by all countries, organizations, institutions, and individuals that support terrorism, we are perhaps inviting another terror attack, possibly worse then September 11."  If we need any evidence for that suffice it to examine the rhetoric emanating out of Al Qaida and the Palestinians in support of "martyrdom" as a means to achieve their political end.

 

For the long term (however defined) the verdict is not yet out on whether terrorism as a strategy is not about to win.  But for the shorter term (say the last 55 years) even some on the Palestinian side have internalized the reality that the Palestinian extremist position of acquisition by force and by the ‘all or nothing' approach has (thus far) failed to yield the desired results.

 

In one of the best - yet very rare - moments of critical introspection a Palestinian writer criticizes the Palestinian "all or nothing policy" which so far got them nothing and salutes the Zionist model that was able to reach the establishment of a state 50 years after the dream for it was laid out ("Palestinian Liberal Columnist On: The Palestinian 'All or Nothing' Policy," MEMRI, Special Dispatch - Palestinian Authority/Reform in the Arab and Muslim World, September 14, 2003, No. 573).

 

Tawfiq Abu Bakr published his article in the Palestinian Authority daily Al-Ayyam arguing that "the Zionists never demanded the impossible," that "we burnt our chances in cold blood" and that "when a state became an option in 2000, we reverted to 'all or nothing.'" The question of course remains why is he able to see this but the rest of the Palestinian leadership and people are not.  In all likelihood, the answers lie sin the dominant mind-set where force, thuggery, and violence are a pre-requisite means for obtaining political goals irrespective of the cost incurred.

 

Yet, for the time being, such voices are far from being dominant nor are they influential.  Indeed, after three years of heavy casualties and exercising restraint, Israelis are starting to show their impatience. Earlier in the week the Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and former Mayor of Jerusalem has rattled some cages when he stated that killing Arafat is one of the options available to Israel. Shortly thereafter he published an article ("End of the Road Map: Israel cannot afford Yasser Arafat's presence in its midst," Ehud Olmert, The Wall Street Journal September 15, 2003) that describes why Arafat is the source of the problem and not part of the solution.

 

Two days later the same paper came out with an editorial ("The End of 'Arafat': Even if he lives, the idea of him must die," The Wall Street Journal, September 17, 2003) that went even further than merely focusing on Arafat as a person. Rather, it suggested to focus on Arafat as a phenomenon, as an idea, for what the person represents.  The editorial did not call for killing Arafat personally but certainly recommended removing him and what he stands for: "Where Yasser Arafat spends the rest of his life is not important. What matters is for the world to recognize that it is time to get rid of ‘Arafat.'"

 

Yet, such editorials do not reflect the official positions of the White House, State Department or the international community.  Regrettably all these stood up to express their strenuous objections to removing Arafat by force and their strong opposition to killing him.  They did not suggest that he did not deserve to be moved but that the outcome will not be a desired one because it might enrage the Arab and Muslim world. 

 

A more typical editorial is the pious one in the Atlanta paper ("OUR VIEW: Subtracting Arafat won't bring Mideast peace closer ," Editorial, Atlanta Journal Constitution, September 18, 2003) which reflects these altitudes all too well.  Surely the removal of Arafat may not bring peace any closer - as it is what Arafat represents that is the problem -  but can the editorial say the same about not removing him?  The problem with the editorial and the "position" it represents is that it falsely equates terror with the action against it and thus renders any defense futile.  The other problem is that it does not offer a viable alterative to deal with the problem

 

A day later President Bush declared Arafat a "Failed Leader" ("Bush: Arafat a 'failed leader'" Janine Zacharia, The Jerusalem Post, Sep. 19, 2003).  This is as far as diplomatic lingo was utilized to express "displeasure" with Arafat.  It is no compliment to him but it also did not go far enough to declare him enemy of peace and place him among the top 52 cards of wanted terrorists who need to be brought to justice.  The cartoon by Chuck Asay (scroll down to: The Colorado Springs Gazette, September 16, 2003) aptly illustrates that what the US allows itself to do when it fights terrorism (directed against the US) it still does not allow Israel to do when it faces the daily horrors of terrorism.

 

But frankly, the metaphor of a failed leader is insufficient.  A failed musician may disappoint the audience, a failed businessman may disappoint the board, and a failed physician may risk a law suit and ouster; and a failed sportsman may not qualify for the next competition or return home with the cup.  They do not kill their audience or constituencies and if they do they will be prosecuted as criminals.  In areas where performance matters failure means only one thing: you are out.

 

But not in politics where failure is almost a guarantee for long-term success.  The problem with Arafat is that his "failure" as a leader does not make him merely an "academic option" for the next elections. His failure costs lives of Israelis and Americans and misery for his own people. Therefore he is much more than failure. Arafat is a malignant growth ("End of the Road Map . . .And the beginning of a new Israeli strategy," Tom Rose, Weekly Standard, 09/22/2003, Volume 009, Issue 02) or, to borough from Thomas Friedman's litany on France, he IS THE ENEMY. Enemies are to be fought not to be negotiated with or heaped Nobel Prizes on.  And whether arguments ensue about the wisdom of killing him there should be no doubt that he and his empire of corruption and evil should be fought and removed ("U.S. vs. Arafat: A necessary policy," Rachel Ehrenfeld, National Review, September 19, 2003).
 
It appears that the US is inching closer to this position ("The Real Debate Begins Israel gets serious. U.S. will soon," Barbara Lerner, National Review, September 17, 2003).  Palestinians demonstrate in favor of Arafat and support groups decadently, admiringly, dance and worship Arafat in front of his HQ as useful idiots offer themselves to be used as "human shields" (including some Israelis). And the new Palestinian "Prime Minister" of the day declares that Arafat is the "elected leader" and that he is the "address" for any political negotiations.  All this is to show that The Wall Street Editorial is correct in identifying Arafatism as the problem and that not much hope or stock should be put in the new "prime minister."

 

But if the US is inching - very slowly - towards understanding that Arafatism is the problem, the UN is going in the opposite direction under the same old ritual.  After being vetoed by the US at the Security Council, the UN General Assembly has just voted, with mouths frothing, in favor of (oh yes another) resolution against Israel, this time to end Israel's suggestion to remove Arafat ("UN votes for end to Israel's threat to 'remove' Arafat," Shlomo Shamir, Haaretz, 20/09/2003). 
 
Leading the anti-Israeli and anti-American world chorus is non other than France.  Little wonder then that the past week has evidenced several highly critical observations about France.  One suggested that French foreign policy on Iraq is heavily laced with anti-Americanism ("A game in which everyone loses," Amir Taheri, The Jerusalem Post, Sep. 19, 2003): "France had no Iraq policy then and has none now. The gap was and still is filled with anti-American gestures in the United Nations and elsewhere. The formula is simple: ‘Say merde to the Americans and you have a policy!'"

 

It is clear that anti-Americanism is becoming the corner stone of French foreign policy; namely, it wants to position itself as a world leader, reminiscent of the "glorious days" of the French Empire and the chance of success increases (or so the French think) by putting obstacles - literally sabotaging - the dominant power in the world. The weaker the US could be made by France, the stronger France becomes. That is at least the narrow-interest vision characteristic of current French foreign policy. Thus French anti-Americanism becomes the overarching foreign policy of France and shapes its attitudes with regards to "local" conflicts such as Iraq or the Palestinians.
 
This of course has not gone unnoticed in America.  Indeed one influential commentator went as far as declaring France the enemy of the United States ("Our War With France," Thomas L. Friedman, The New York Times, September 18, 2003) and warns that "...if America is defeated in Iraq by a coalition of Saddamists and Islamists, radical Muslim groups — from Baghdad to the Muslim slums of Paris — will all be energized, and the forces of modernism and tolerance within these Muslim communities will be on the run. To think that France, with its large Muslim minority, where radicals are already gaining strength, would not see its own social fabric affected by this is fanciful."
 
Friedman is absolutely correct.  Sort of.  He is correct about France but by the same token that the US cannot afford a defeat in Iraq neither can Israel acquiesce to the demands for its own demise (despite the differences in circumstances) and afford a defeat by the Palestinians (beyond the current bleeding and economic loss it already is suffering). Yet Friedman himself has consistently criticized Israel, recommending "evenhandedness," showing sympathy for the Palestinians, and seeing the settlements as "obstacles" to peace.  Friedman could have the prefect article if he would rewrite the article and substitute the subjects appropriately. For example, in the re-written article the above paragraph would read: "...if Israel is defeated by a coalition of Palestinians and Islamists, radical Muslim groups and countries — from Iran to the Muslim slums of London — will all be energized, and then turn their fury against France, the United States, and the rest of the free world.  To think that the West would not see its own social fabric - indeed its very own existence - affected by this is delusory."  And in this case we are not only talking social fabric. We are talking the very existence.
 
The situation in the Middle East has been complicated beyond imagination since the Arab nations have concocted the Palestinian problem on the world (since 1948).  After failing to destroy Israel by force in 1948, 1967, and 1973 (when they were as close as ever to doing so) they resorted to the smart weapon: politics.  After fomenting for decades the "refugee problem" - that they themselves created - they turned into undoing Israel by the power of politics.  Therefore, one way of fighting the artificial realities of the area is by demystifying some of the inventions that have sprouted as acceptable mantra and the refugee issue is one to be addressed for what it really is ("The great refugee scam," Shmuel Katz, The Jerusalem Post, Sep. 18, 2003).

And it is not only the refugee concoction that clouds the atmosphere in the area. From the Palestinian map that overlaps all of Israel through the "oddity" of the PLO not wanting any parts of the West Bank and the Gaza strip when they were under Arab control (prior to 1967), to the misnomer of "occupied territories" that somehow "automatically" belong to the Palestinians, a series of interesting questions is raised by one author ("15 Things I Don't Understand about the Mideast Peace Process: Ten years after Oslo, am I imagining things -- or is the situation truly insane?" Ephraim Shore, Jewish World, September 14, 2003).
 

The undercurrents are fairly easily observable and some of these processes will take time.  The question remains as to how long a time and at what cost will the West unify its efforts against an enemy that declares itself to be one.  Al we have to do is read its spewing daily vitriolic rhetoric.  As President Bush once said about terrorism "you are either with us or against us" in the fight against it.  It appears that France is positioning itself to be against us.  Can the French save themselves from themselves or will the Americans have to do it (again) for them?